Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan to use the water available in the Indus River system in the territories of the two countries. The treaty was negotiated by India and Pakistan with the mediation of World Bank, and signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani president Ayub Khan. It classifies six major rivers of the Indus Basin into two categories, and gives India control over the waters of the three "Eastern Rivers"—the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej—which have a total mean annual flow of 33 million acre⋅ft (41 billion m3), while control over the three "Western Rivers"—the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum—which have a total mean annual flow of 135 million acre⋅ft (167 billion m3), was given to Pakistan.

Quotes

• Since the Treaty’s signing, Pakistan has consistently used its dispute resolution provisions as a strategic tool to delay and effectively obstruct development rather than genuinely resolve disputes. … In several cases, Pakistan has acknowledged the potential benefits of Indian projects for regulated water flow, including flood moderation—while simultaneously opposing them. This pattern reveals that Pakistani objections are not genuinely about Treaty compliance; they are about preventing Indian development in Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of the legal merits. … The Treaty was intended to achieve the “most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers” in a “spirit of goodwill and friendship”—a context that no longer exists. The treaties derive their legitimacy not merely from the force of law but from the good-faith implementation of their terms by all signatories. … Bilateral agreements cannot be selectively honored: a state cannot simultaneously breach the foundational norms of inter-state conduct and demand that its negotiating partner fulfill treaty obligations that disproportionately benefit the norm-breaker. The Treaty cannot be an island of Indian compliance within a sea of Pakistani bad faith. India’s step represents an assertion long overdue—that international agreements are a two-way street. … To those who ask why to hold the Treaty in abeyance now, it would be useful to remember that there is no wrong time for a right decision.
  • Pradeep Kumar Saxena, "India, Pakistan, and the Indus Waters Treaty. 2. Obstruction, Exploitation and the Long-Overdue Reckoning", Bitter Winter (July 21, 2026)