Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; Arabic acronym: داعش Dāʿish) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is a Sunni jihadist group in the Middle East, Libya and Nigeria. In June 2014, the group renamed itself the Islamic State (IS), but the new name has been widely criticised and condemned, with the United Nations (U.N.), various governments, and mainstream Muslim groups refusing to use it. Dar al-Ifta al-Misriyyah, a leading Islamic authority in Egypt, advised Muslims to stop calling the group Islamic State and instead refer to it as Al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria (QSIS) due to the militant group's un-Islamic character. In its self-proclaimed status as a caliphate, the Islamic State claims religious authority over all Muslims across the world and aspires to bring most of the Muslim-inhabited regions of the world under its political control beginning with Iraq, Syria and other territories in the Levant region which include Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus and part of southern Turkey. It has been designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, and has been described by the U.N. and Western and Middle Eastern media as a terrorist group and by other countries such as Colombia as a fundamentalist and extremist organisation. The United Nations and Amnesty International have accused the group of grave human rights abuses.
Quotes[edit]
- Thus, he is the imam and khalīfah for the Muslims everywhere. Accordingly, the "Iraq and Shām" in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration.
- As quoted in "ISIS announces formation of Caliphate, rebrands as 'Islamic State'", The Long War Journal (29 June 2014, retrieved 30 June 2014).
Quotes about the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant[edit]
- Barack Obama became the fourth consecutive U.S. president to order air strikes in Iraq.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- Had the U.S. bombed Syria last summer, it would've likely strengthened the position of various rebel groups pressing for political control. ISIS has emerged as the strongest of these, despite being dismissed as junior varsity by the president (along with other "Al-Qaeda affiliates," like Boko Haram) back in January. Other rebel groups, including ones Congress authorized the U.S. military to arm (an idea the CIA has tried and dismissed), have tried to avoid conflict with ISIS. Several groups reportedly signed a "non-aggression" pact with ISIS (which other groups downplayed or denied), and even the Free Syrian Army, Washington's favorite rebel outfit, says it refuses to join the anti-ISIS coalition.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- Bombing ISIS in Syria may strengthen the Assad regime, other rebel groups, or a different set of jihadis looking to pick up where ISIS is left off.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- [referring to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar, Iran, and Syria] The threat ISIS poses to all these countries is real, and ought to be met by them. U.S. leadership in the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq, and now Syria, where a slew of other countries have been involved over the last several years, only stymies the possibility of self-interested coalition-building, the strongest foundation for mutually beneficial international relations.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- Try as U.S. military planners may to not allow the bombing campaign to help the Syrian regime's strategic position too much, any effective campaign against ISIS will do so.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- The argument that U.S. actions in Iraq are covered by the post-9/11 AUMF against al-Qaeda and associated forces ought to rejected. ISIS broke off with al-Qaeda and challenged its authority—claiming itself a caliphate with dominion over all Muslims—very publicly. ISIS began as an al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq before crossing over to join the civil war in Syria and eventually challenge the local al-Qaeda affiliate there. By the time it returned to Iraq it was the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, challenging terrorist groups and governments across the region. ISIS has as much to do with 9/11 as Iraq did in 2003. Even George W. Bush, whose administration tried to link Saddam Hussein's Iraq to 9/11, didn't try to use the 9/11 AUMF for the Iraq War.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- ISIS draws its legitimacy from anti-Americanism. The same fuel that keeps kleptocratic regimes in the region in power is harnessed to keep ISIS' fighters aflame. In the comic book world of ISIS' leaders, a great final battle with the United States is welcomed, even if it means their very degradation. ISIS fighters can be killed, its leadership decimated, but their "martyrdom" will prepare the next generation of fighters.
- Ed Krayewski, "Four Reasons Bombing ISIS in Syria Isn't Well Thought-Out", Reason (23 September 2014).
- ISIS wasn't a threat two years ago. Why? Because they would have probably been wiped out by Assad. But we put six-hundred tons of weapons into the Syrian civil war, and what has happened? We created a haven—not just us—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates—they've poured weapons indiscriminately in there, and most of them have wound up in the hands of ISIS.
- Sen. Rand Paul, (R-KY), Rand Paul in North Carolina on C-SPAN (1 October 2014).
- What should the United States do about ISIS now that they've taken over half of Syria and a third of Iraq?
The answer is: let Assad, the Iranians, the Turks, and, yes, the Russians take care of it, since they are the states directly threatened by the growth of the so-called Islamic State. Why should we fight their war for them?
Contrary to the War Party's hebephrenic appeals to intervene, inaction on our part is key to the destruction of ISIS. The Grand Caliph of the Islamic State would like nothing more than to be able to portray ISIS as the valiant opponent of a US reentry into the region. It would be a tremendous propaganda victory for them to be able to frame their cause in this context because the result would be a successful international recruiting drive that would fill the ranks of the Islamic State's army even as hundreds are killed by US drones and missile strikes.
- Justin Raimondo, "ISIS: Made in Washington, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv", Antiwar.com (25 August 2014).
- No, we don't have to ally with Assad–or the Iranians, for that matter–for them to deal effectively with our monstrous creations. We simply have to stand aside and watch as those states with a real stake in this fight are allowed to take aim and fire. In this case, inaction is the most effective act we can take: by stopping our support for the Syrian Islamists, we cut off a major source of support for ISIS–and leave Assad free to go after them hammer and tongs.
ISIS and its sympathizers worldwide would like nothing better than to lure us into another land war in the Middle East, one in which we would fare no better than we did last time around. Yet that is the only alternative to the Rand Paul strategy.
- Justin Raimondo, "America's Frankenstein Brigade", Antiwar.com (10 September 2014).
- And as for his claim that the Islamic State "is certainly not a state," the President's tone is rather too defensive. He says "it is recognized by no government, nor by the people it subjugates," but none of these factors are relevant in determining what constitutes a state–which is nothing more or less than a monopoly on the use of force in a given territory. The horror that is ISIL is merely the process of state formation looked at up close: the terror they employ is simply an exaggerated rendition of how every state gains its "legitimacy"–by definitively establishing its coercive monopoly. While ISIL is doing so in a particularly graphic manner, in principle it is acting no differently than any other embryonic state in history, benign creation myths to the contrary notwithstanding.
- Justin Raimondo, "Iraq War III: Obama's 'Operation Doubletalk'", Antiwar.com (12 September 2014).
- So, is “Caliph Ibrahim” of the Islamic State an extremist, a militant, a terrorist or an Islamic fighter? None of the above. All those labels imply behavior that makes some sort of sense in terms of human reality and normal ideologies. Yet the Islamic State and its kindred have broken out of the entire conceivable range of political activity, even its extreme forms. A “militant” spends much of his time promoting an idea or a political program within acceptable rules of behavior. The neo-Islamists, by contrast, recognize no rules apart from those they themselves set; they have no desire to win an argument through hard canvassing. They don’t even seek to impose a point of view; they seek naked and brutal domination. A “terrorist,” meanwhile, tries to instill fear in an adversary from whom he demands specific concessions. Yet the Islamic State et al. use mass murder to such ends. They don’t want to persuade or cajole anyone to do anything in particular; they want everything. “Islamic fighter” is equally inapt. An Islamic fighter is a Muslim who fights a hostile infidel who is trying to prevent Muslims from practicing their faith. That was not the situation in Mosul. No one was preventing the city’s Muslim majority from practicing their faith, let alone forcing them to covert to another religion. Yet the Islamic State came, conquered and began to slaughter. The Islamic State kills people because it can. And in both Syria and Iraq it has killed more Muslims than members of any other religious community. How, then, can we define a phenomenon that has made even al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Khomeinist gangs appear “moderate” in comparison? The international community faced a similar question in the 18th century when pirates acted as a law onto themselves, ignoring the most basic norms of human interaction. The issue was discussed in long negotiations that led to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty of Rastadt (1714) and developed a new judicial concept: the crime against humanity. Those who committed that crime would qualify as “enemies of mankind” — in Latin, hostis generis humanis. Individuals and groups convicted of such a crime were no longer covered by penal codes or even the laws of war. They’d set themselves outside humanity by behaving like wild beasts... Neo-Islamist groups represent a cocktail of nihilism and crimes against humanity. Like the pirates of yesteryear, they’ve attracted criminals from many different nationalities... Having embarked on genocide, the neo-Islamists do not represent an Iraqi or Syrian or Nigerian problem, but a problem for humanity as a whole. They are not enemies of any particular religion, sect or government but enemies of mankind. They deserve to be treated as such (as do the various governments and semi-governmental “charities” that help them). To deal with these enemies of mankind, we need much more than frozen bank accounts and visa restrictions.
- Amir Taheri, "Beyond terrorism: ISIS and other enemies of humanity", New York Post (20 August 2014).
- 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide. In fact, these terrorists have made the world’s muslims their greatest target. We will not allow them to hijack
our faith.