Nicola Abbagnano

Nicola Abbagnano

Nicola Abbagnano (1901 – 1990) was an Italian existential philosopher.

Quotes

• Existence appears as an “ex-sistere” from nothingness.

• From La struttura dell'esistenza (“The Structure of Existence”).

• The ideal of reason that had emerged in the modern world with Grotius and Descartes found one of its first typical expressions in Spinoza.

• From “'Storia della filosofia”', UTET, Turin, 1948.

• Secularism should be considered as mutual autonomy not only between political and religious thought, but between all human activities, which must be subordinate to one another in a relationship of hierarchical dependence, nor can they be subject to ends or interests that are foreign to them, but must autonomously carry out their own purposes and internal rules. This corresponds, in the relationships between activities, to freedom in the relationships between individuals.

Quoted in Carlo Flamigni, “”Secularism without adjectives“”, “'carloflamigni.it”', July 2012.

• Reason itself is fallible, and this fallibility must find its place in logic.

• From “'Scritti neoilluministici. 1948-1965”', edited by Bruno Maiorca, UTET, 2001.

• The final situation of the effort towards being realises its essential unity with the initial situation.

• From “'La struttura dell'esistenza”', Paravia, 1939).

• Truth is precisely the abstract and symbolic expression of a given moment in life; and just as this is never equal to itself but transforms into a motion that has no rest, so too does its correlative aspect change according to its rhythm.

• From “'The Irrational Sources of Thought”', F. Perrella, Genoa – Naples – Florence – Città di Castello, 1923.

• Marcus Aurelius does not direct his reflections to others but only to himself. The “”Memoirs“” are not a lesson for an ideal or real disciple (as Seneca's “'Letters to Lucilius”' were), but a continuous effort to remind “'himself”' of the philosophical cornerstones that alone can guarantee him serenity and inner peace.
  They therefore have a dramatic tone that is lacking in other ancient and modern moral works. Marcus Aurelius' interlocutor is only himself: Marcus Aurelius, emperor and man. Only within himself does he believe he can find the law of truth and goodness. Seeking solitude is useless, he says; one must withdraw into oneself because only in the depths of one's soul can tranquillity and truth be found. This attitude, which was adopted by the Christian world, is the fundamental leitmotif of Marcus Aurelius's “Memoirs”. In himself, man finds the reason with which divine providence has ordered the universe, and the criterion of truth and moral conduct.
  But by withdrawing into himself, man does not find himself in isolation: reason binds him to all men with whom he shares it.

• From “Marco Aurelio riletto per il nostro tempo” [Marcus Aurelius re-read for our times], “La Stampa”, 13 February 1969, p. 3.

• In the modern world, allegory has lost its value and it has been denied that it can express the nature or function of poetry. It has been seen as the juxtaposition of two different spiritual facts, the concept on the one hand and the image on the other, between which it would establish a conventional and arbitrary correlation (Croce); and above all, it has been accused of neglecting or rendering impossible the autonomy of the poetic image, which would have no life of its own because it would be subordinate to the requirements of the conceptual scheme it is supposed to embody. Much of modern aesthetics therefore declares allegory to be cold, poor and boring; and rather insists, in the interpretation of poetry and art in general, on the value of the symbol, which can be alive and evocative because the symbolic image is autonomous and has an interest in itself, that is, an interest that does not derive from its conventional reference to a concept or doctrine. However, if we take into account the power or vitality of certain works of art with a clear allegorical structure (e.g., the Divine Comedy and many medieval and Renaissance paintings), we must say that allegory does not necessarily make the autonomy and lightness of the aesthetic image impossible and that, in certain cases, even the precise correspondence between the image and the concept may not be mortifying for the former and may not take away from it the vitality of art or poetry. T. S. Eliot made a defence of allegory in this sense, precisely with regard to Dante.

• From “'Dizionario di filosofia”', Utet, Turin, 1971.

• To discover the authentic objectivity of the world, man must not think of the world as a part of himself, but must feel himself as a part of the world.

From “'Filosofia, religione, scienza”', Taylor, 1967.

• Only those who isolate themselves from themselves and from their neighbours are truly alone.

• From “'La saggezza della vita”', Rusconi, 1985⁹.

Ricordi di un filosofo

Nicola Abbagnano, Ricordi di un filosofo, Marcello Staglieno (editor), Rizzoli, Milano, 1990. ISBN 88-17-84011-4

• Naples, moreover, remained essentially impervious to Fascism. The same was true of the notables who, even in 1922, on the eve of the March on Rome, had applauded Mussolini at the San Carlo Theatre until their hands were sore. The people were equally indifferent to Mussolini's slogans, due to their atavistic scepticism (a flaw that can sometimes become a virtue). (from “'Don Benedetto e io”', p. 12.)
• When I wandered around Naples sixty years ago, breathing in the salty air amid the cries of the fishmongers, I certainly did not encounter the Absolute Spirit, which advances through history via its dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. I was assailed, painfully and sweetly, only by the manifold reality. I saw the faces of the Neapolitans, their mocking expressions, with an ancient and popular wisdom, at one with the courtly and familiar misery of the “most noble Naples”, between the baroque solemnity of the monuments and the squalor of the slums. I told myself that Hegel's “Ratio” was far removed from all this, from the beauty of the women, from the dazzling glances of the dark eyes behind the long lashes of the girls down in Via Toledo and Chiaia, in the boisterous cheerfulness that greeted you everywhere, even in poverty, even in the tattered multicoloured clothes drying in the alleys in the night breeze, under the moon. Was it perhaps the Absolute that was the subject of the real world, of history, or rather the multiplicity of individuals, with their authentic needs? (from “'L'assoluto e l'odor di pesce”', p. 20)
• I was also “educated” about humanity by the ancient Neapolitan cunning, known as the “art of getting by”, or rather, of surviving what was perhaps invincible poverty. There were, for example, the sellers of fake gold, who approached tourists who had just disembarked or were about to enter Zi' Teresa's shop with brazen impudence to sell them some “knock-offs”, there were the old men of San Gennaro dei Poveri who, for a fee, would go from Piazza Carlo III to people's homes to mourn the dead, and could go as far as Vietri and Sorrento if necessary (for triple or at least double the pay: 150 lire); on every corner there were water sellers offering jugs of ice-cold water, along with improvised vendors of pasta, steaming vermicelli freshly served with a sprinkling of tomatoes and pepper; and there were prostitutes, young and old, selling themselves with the same look, sometimes brazen, sometimes imploring. In books and in small everyday events, I found constant, mutual confirmation [...] (from “'Nella Napoli nobilissima”', p. 31)
• Never did the sky of Turin, with the still snow-capped crown of the Alps, appear to me ^[sic] with solar clarity as when, on 28 April 1945, the nightmare of war ended. The city was invaded by thousands of vehicles which, previously hidden because the Germans intended to requisition them, now proceeded honking their horns through the centre in a joyful popular celebration. The city, a third of which had been destroyed by bombing, thought only of rebuilding from that moment on, in the fervent climate of hope that had taken hold of the entire nation. (from “'Le scimmie di Sartre”', p. 58)
• [...] anti-humanism is a characteristic feature of certain contemporary philosophies that at first glance are the antithesis of what Severino defends. They are, in fact, philosophies that deny Being and affirm appearance in its disorder, in its accidentality, in the arbitrary games of which man himself is the random result. By insisting on the “'difference”' between appearance and Being, these philosophies attribute to appearance, which for them is the only “reality” (if it can be called that) that can be spoken of, the characteristics opposite to those of Parmenidean Being. Severino, on the other hand, insists on these characteristics and denies the others. But he too reduces man to the domain of appearance and sees him resolved in it. “In Western language,” he says, “‘man’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘group’, “people”, ‘social class’ are words that express the forms taken by the persuasion that isolates the Earth, that is, the forms of alienation from truth”. In other words, they are “forms of error”. And so man and his world seem to be dismissed. But the “error” mentioned above can only be committed by Destiny, and so we can see in man “the appearance of Destiny”, that is, the dimension in which only “the occurrence of the mortal” is possible, with all that it implies. (from “Emanuele Severino”, pp. 104-105)
• According to Severino, this alienation is at the root of all Western civilisation, which has accepted nihilism in post-Parmenidean metaphysics. We think and experience things as if they were nothing. Technology is nothing more than the salient manifestation of this attitude, which consists in transforming, producing and using things as if they had no reality of their own, as if they were nothing. Therefore, according to Severino, the triumph of technology is the triumph of nihilism. But those who, like him, oppose this triumph and plan a different world do not really escape nihilism because they continue to believe in becoming, in history, in time, that is, in the dominion of nothingness. “Their demands and their plans for a more humane world are the relics that the desert leaves behind as it grows. Philosophy, Christianity, Marxism, art are the relics of the growing desert.” (from “Emanuele Severino”, p. 107)
• A lesson in humility springs from Severino's philosophy, however one may judge its Parmenidean assumptions: humility which, if it makes man more a spectator than an actor, is nevertheless indispensable to him as knowledge of his own measure. And the second lesson that can be drawn from this philosophy is respect for the world and for the things of the world which, if they are authentic realities, cannot be reduced to nothing by human endeavour. Finally (and this is certainly not the least important thing), the philosophy that Severino defends places the recognition of truth, whatever it may be, even if painful and unpleasant for man, as the supreme value. Humility, respect and fidelity to the truth are not values that are commonly recognised and defended in the contemporary era. I do not know whether it is essential to go back to Parmenides in order to rediscover them. It is certain, however, that in this era the fascination with nothingness, which is expressed, among other things, in violence and destruction, plays a dominant role: and that those who fight it, by highlighting its hidden sources, render a service not only to truth but to mankind itself. (from “'Emanuele Severino”', pp. 107-108)
• One cannot ignore that at the heart of the attitude still referred to today as “weak thought” and which continues to have its ^[sic] in Gianni Vattimo, there is a persistent trace of that longing for the infinite that was characteristic of romanticism. It replaces the infinity of Being, Truth and Perfection, which Romanticism dreamed of, with the infinity of transience, error and evil as the nature of the world, thus absolutising appearance in its worst forms and making human experience the destiny of nothingness. This new romantic dream, which is the inverse of the nineteenth-century one, may perhaps appeal as a literary expression of the crisis, the prevailing evils, the dangers facing humanity today, but it does not indicate any way out.
  Is Vattimo aware of this? I believe so. And I believe he is looking for one. (from “'Gianni Vattimo”', p. 113)
• Questioning ourselves about a “politics” of intellectuals is important today, not least because we live in a time when so-called “cultural products” are increasingly involved in consumerism. They are often manipulated with a view to immediate and fleeting success, which they sometimes fail to achieve or which lasts only a morning. They often set out to shock, irritate and scandalise (which is also very difficult) in order to impose themselves with the label of absolute novelty, which is pure illusion. They often take on the function and value of “slogans” intended to increase the spread of foolish ideas and fictitious fanaticism. And their authors do not hesitate to take to the stage, to perform in costume, to put on the show they consider most conducive to their success. [...]
  Part of the bitter sadness that pervades the world of intellectuals today is due precisely to the awareness of their lost or diminished decision-making autonomy, of the looming danger of being able to survive only as instruments of forces that appreciate their work only as an occasional means of success, to be thrown away when it is no longer useful. (from “Il rischio del consumismo”, pp. 142-143)
• A personality cannot express itself through suicide or the murder of others. Suicide and murder are the latent ends of a sex that rebels against its own measure. Sadism and masochism are the extreme limits of this tendency, which has many degrees in between. It is in the name of feminism that people today usually protest against the reduction of their sexual partner to a thing, an instrumental object, no more valid than a rubber doll. But in reality, anyone who turns their partner into a thing degrades themselves into a thing. (from “'Sesso e morale”', p. 166)
• Entertainment, in the form in which it is enjoyed today, is a vain escape from the problems of life towards the immediate acceptance of the most striking aspects of life itself. It does not seek serenity but oblivion, not peace but agitation, not enjoyment but orgy. And so the underlying problems remain hidden and the possibilities for their solution recede. It is not the marginal forms, labelled “escapism”, that constitute the most serious form of escapism, but the dominant forms, preferred by the multitude, accepted without question, encouraged by success. And in the face of these, the question arises: what will “entertain” us from entertainment? (from “Evasioni dal quotidiano” [Escapes from everyday life], pp. 170-171)