Salvatore Natoli

q:it:Salvatore Natoli (born in 1942) is an Italian philosopher and university professor, and a disciple of Emanuele Severino.

Quotes

• Christianity has altered the pagan soul. When the dream of a world without pain appeared, we could no longer adapt to this pain, even though we believe that a world without pain will never exist. Consciousness has been visited by a dream that can no longer be erased, and even if we believe it to be unlikely, we still want it to exist.

• from “'I Nuovi pagani”' [The New Pagans], Il saggiatore, Milan, 1995.

• In the Gospel of Luke, for example, we find a beautiful image of happiness, in which the Virgin Mary goes to visit her cousin Elizabeth, who, like Mary, is pregnant. It then happens that, at the sight of Mary, the child in Elizabeth's womb begins to leap. Think of the motion of joy as this “jumping”!

• quoted from La felicità (“Happiness”) in “Il Grillo” on 27 November 1998.

• Francis de Sales concedes nothing to the pagan style, which, moreover, has long since abandoned its tragic guise in ancient schools.

• from “'L'Esperienza del dolore: le forme del patire nella cultura occidentale”' [The Experience of Pain: Forms of Suffering in Western Culture], Feltrinelli Editore, 1986.

L'edificazione di sé

Salvatore Natoli, L'edificazione di sé. Istruzioni sulla vita interiore, Laterza, 2010. ISBN 8842093890

• “'Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usus”': life is not given as property to anyone, but “'for use”' to everyone. (p. 3)
• If we want to talk about freedom, we can say that the more we gain knowledge of the processes that determine us, the more we are able to be free. (p. 8)
• We humans, as singular entities, are finite powers, and in order to make the most of the power that we are, we must know how to manage it, to become its masters. This and nothing else is what it means to take ownership of life. (p. 8)
• If desire stimulates invention, it can, however, lead us to a presumption of omnipotence and thus become a cause of deception. It makes us forget that we are finite powers: in fact, our power is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; therefore, as Spinoza would say, we do not have absolute power to adapt things outside ourselves to our use (ad nostrum usum adaptandi). We are therefore destabilised from within and without: by the impulses that press upon us and by the affections that condition us from outside. And since we do not know how powerful we are, desire manages to set us in motion without our knowledge, bypassing our consciousness. Proof of this is the fact that we often find ourselves agitated, upset, or even happy, without knowing why. Hence an instabilitas that we must govern. This is why desire, which is positive in itself, should not be passively indulged. However, it should not be denied either: it must simply be well managed. We need to measure the multiple powers that agitate us. In the words of Nietzsche, “greatness means giving direction”. To do this, virtues are necessary. (pp. 18-19)
• Being virtuous means putting oneself in a position to decide and therefore not easily yielding to external influences. As we can see, virtue has nothing to do with renouncing desire, but rather with controlling it in order to avoid dependence. Unfortunately, centuries of teaching renunciation have transformed what was a technical expedient – the ancients called it an exercise – into a value, to the point of making the very idea of “control of the passions” ambiguous. This has led to the identification of passions with evil, and hence to the logical consequence of eradicating them. This is an impossible task, and one in which all pedagogies that have attempted to achieve it have failed: they have not eradicated passions at all, but have only generated perversions. (pp. 22-23)
• Virtues are thus losing their traits of self-denial and taking on those of self-realisation. And, as was already the case for the ancients, happiness, far from being conceived as a reward for virtue, tends to coincide with its exercise. (p. 38)
• But good can never be imposed: it must be continually sought and chosen each time. (p. 43)
• The question is: to what extent is what is “possible” actually “possible”? In other words, where is the boundary between what is “lawful” and what is “achievable”? (p. 46)
• The first rule of any discourse is, in fact, to “tell the truth”. (p. 55)
• No one is ever right in advance, and it is therefore a cognitive necessity and a moral obligation to submit one's thoughts to the truth and the judgement of others. (p. 57)
• If it is a duty to reprimand one's friends, it is a sign of great wisdom to take the criticism of one's enemies seriously. (p. 59)
• The processes of emancipation have undoubtedly expanded the scope for autonomy and choice, but they have also instilled a demand for unconditional freedom without even being up to the task. (p. 65)
• At this stage of civilisation, in order to avoid being manipulated and at the same time divided, controlled and serialised, it is necessary to “fall back” on oneself, to establish oneself as a “nucleus of resistance” and a “centre of strength”. In order to assert oneself, it is necessary to consolidate, preserve one's form, give oneself a style... (p. 68)

Parole della filosofia o Dell'arte di meditare

Salvatore Natoli, Parole della filosofia o Dell'arte di meditare, Feltrinelli, 2010. ISBN 8807944529

• Paradoxically, by mastering oneself, one becomes more open to others, indirectly becoming generous, since “bonum est diffusivum sui”. This is magnanimity, the great ancient virtue whose name has been lost today. (p. 133)
• The magnanimous person, in fact, should not be confused with the generous person: he is someone who aims for great things and, by committing himself to this, produces good things and, if he is strong enough, an overabundance of good that benefits everyone. (p. 133)
• The magnanimous person does not look at others, not because he underestimates them, but because he finds his own measure in the task he has set himself. (p. 133).