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- In any remembering, thinking or imagining, although the object of my intending is some state of affairs or other, I am also potentially aware as I intend that what I am doing is an act of remembering, thinking, or imagining. My asserting that S is P is not an assertion of mine unless I am implicitly aware as I assert that I am asserting, not entertaining the possibility that, S is P.
- Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge University Press: 1989), p. 21
- No sincere assertion of fact is essentially unaccompanied by feelings of intellectual satisfaction or of a persuasive desire and a sense of personal responsibility.
- Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958), p. 27