Nathaniel Lindley, Baron Lindley

I confess that when I am sought to be driven to a conclusion which appears to me unreasonable and unjust, I at once suspect the validity of the premises, even if I can detect no flaw in the reasoning from them.

Nathaniel Lindley, Baron Lindley SL PC FRS (29 November 1828 – 9 December 1921) was an English judge.

Quotes

• One does not like to differ from a man without knowing the reasons which influenced him.
  • Ex parte Strawbridge; In re Hickman (1883), L. R. 25 C. D. 276.

• A salvage service which hardly exceeds ordinary towage is naturally remunerated on a very different scale from an heroic rescue from imminent destruction.
  • "The City of Chester" (1884), L. R. 9 Pr. Div. 202.

• As no Court has ever attempted to define fraud, so no Court has ever attempted to define undue influence, which includes one of its many varieties.
  • Allcard v. Skinner (1887), L. R. 36 Ch. 183.

• I take it that reasonable human conduct is part of the ordinary course of things.
  • "The City of Lincoln" (1889), L. R. 15 P. D. 18.

• I do not wish to shake titles, and I shall do precisely what our predecessors have always done—leave the case where it is. It is a rock ahead that everybody knows.
  • In re Lashmar (1890), L. J. Rep. (N S.) 60 Ch. 146.

• I think that common law is better than equity.
  • Angus v. Clifford (1891), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 60 C. D. 455.

• A very ingenious attempt to drive a coach-and-four through this Act of Parliament.
  • Queen v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (1891), 61 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 6.

• We, as lawyers, as men of business, as men of experience, know perfectly well what evils necessarily result from handing over a great family estate to a mortgagee in possession, whose only chance of getting his money is to sacrifice the interests of everybody to money-getting.
  • In re Marquis of Ailesbury's Settled Estates (1891), L. J. Rep. 61 C. D. 123.

• There is nothing illegal in keeping up a tomb; on the contrary, it is a very laudable thing to do.
  • In re Tyler, Tyler v. Tyler (1891), L. R. 3 C. D. [1891], p. 258.

• The welfare of a child is not to be measured by money only, nor by physical comfort only.
  • In re McGrath (Infants), L. R. 1 C. D. (1893), p. 148.

• I do not see why, if we can tell what a man intends, and can give effect to his intention as expressed, we should be driven out of it by other cases or decisions in other cases. I always protest against anything of the sort.
  • In re Morgan (1893), 3 Ch. 228.

• A proceeding may be perfectly legal and may yet be opposed to sound commercial principles.
  • Verner v. General, &c. Trust (1894), L. R. 2 C. D. [1894], 264.

• When we find a series of decisions running down from the time of Sir William Grant, we should be very cautious, and very slow to overrule them.
  • In re Pickard (1894), L. R. 3 C. D. [1894], p. 710; in reference to the case of Finch v. Squire (1804), 10 Ves. 41.

• I confess that when I am sought to be driven to a conclusion which appears to me unreasonable and unjust, I at once suspect the validity of the premises, even if I can detect no flaw in the reasoning from them.
  • In re Holford (1894), L. R. 3 Ch. 45.

• Trade unions up to a certain point have been recognised now as organs for good. They are the only means by which workmen can protect themselves from the tyranny of those who employ them. But the moment that trade unions become tyrants in their turn, they are engines for evil: they have no right to prevent people from working on any terms that they choose.
  • Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins (1896), 74 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 364. Compare Mogul Steamship Co. v. MacGregor, Gow, & Co., 66 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 1; Temperton v. Russell and others, 69 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 78.

• It appears to me wrong in principle for any Court or Judge to impose fetters on the exercise by themselves or others of powers which are left by law to their discretion in each case as it arises.
  • Saunders v. Saunders (1897), L. R. Prob. D. [1897], p. 95.

• I do not mean to say that the Court could not give leave to amend, but I cannot conceive that the Court would listen to an application for leave to amend after the trial. That could not have been intended: it would be opposed to all principles of justice.
  • Lowe v. Lowe (1899), L. R. P. D. C. A. [1899], p. 209.

• I know of no duty of the Court which it is more important to observe, and no powers of the Court which it is more important to enforce, than its power of keeping public bodies within their rights. The moment public bodies exceed their rights] they do so to the injury and oppression of private individuals, and those persons are entitled to be protected from injury arising from such operations of public bodies.
  • Roberts v. Gwyrfai District Council (1899), L. R. 2 C. D. 614.

• Unless Parliament has conferred upon the Court that power in language which is unmistakable, the Court is not to assume that Parliament intended to do that which so seriously affect foreigners who are not resident here, and might give offence to foreign Governments. Unless Parliament has used such plain terms as show that they really intended us to do that, we ought not to do it.
  • In re A. B. & Co. (1900), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. [1900], C. A. p. 544. See also Ex-parte Blain, 12 Ch. D. 522; In re Pearson (1892), 2 Q. B. 263.