Willard van Orman Quine
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From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (1953)
Willard van Orman Quine. From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (1953). Harper and Row, New York
- How are we to adjudicate among rival ontologies? Certainly the answer is not provided by the semantical formula "To be is to be the value of a variable"; this formula serves rather, conversely, in testing the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological standard.
- "On What There Is"
- Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato's beard; historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam's razor.
- "On What There Is"
- Wyman's overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes.
- "On What There Is", p. 4. a humorous comment on the idea "unactualized possible".
- The word 'definition' has come to have a dangerously reassuring sound, owing no doubt to its frequent occurrence in logical and mathematical writings.
- "Two dogmas of Empiricism", p. 26
- Our argument is not flatly circular, but something like it. It has the form, figuratively speaking, of a closed curve in space.
- "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", p. 26
- Tactically, conceptualism is no doubt the strongest position of the three; for the tired nominalist can lapse into conceptualism and still allay his puritanic conscience with the reflection that he has not quite taken to eating lotus with the Platonists.
- A fancifully fancyless medium of unvarnished news.
- A mocking title for the 'protocol language' imagined by some of the logical positivists, in "Word and Object (1960), section 1
- Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.
- "Natural Kinds", in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969), p. 126; originally written for a festschrift for Carl Gustav Hempel, this appears in a context explaining why induction tends to work in practice, despite theoretical objections. The hyphen in "praise-worthy" is ambiguous, since it falls on a line break in the source.
- "Yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation" yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation.
- Quine's paradox, in "The Ways of Paradox" in "The Ways of Paradox and other Essays" (1976)
- Necessity resides in the way we talk about things, not in the things we talk about.
- Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (1976), p. 174
The Web of Belief (1970)
- (2nd ed., 1978). With J. S. Ullian
- At root what is needed for scientific inquiry is just receptivity to data, skill in reasoning, and yearning for truth. Admittedly, ingenuity can help too.
- Implication is thus the very texture of our web of belief, and logic is the theory that traces it.
- S. 41
1980s and later
- It is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.
- Theories and Things, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981
- We cannot stem linguistic change, but we can drag our feet. If each of us were to defy Alexander Pope and be the last to lay the old aside, it might not be a better world, but it would be a lovelier language.
- Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary (1987), p. 231
- Possibly, but my concern is that there not be more things in my philosophy than are in heaven and earth.