Friedrich Hayek

We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage.

The assurance of a certain minimum income for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody need fall even when he is unable to provide for himself, appears not only to be a wholly legitimate protection against a risk common to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the particular small group into which he was born.

Friedrich August von Hayek CH (8 May 1899 – 23 March 1992) was an Austrian, later British, economist and philosopher best known for his defense of classical liberalism. In 1974, Hayek shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (with Gunnar Myrdal) for his "pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and … penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena". (Nobel Memorial Prize, 1974)

We shall not grow wiser before we learn that much that we have done was very foolish.

See also

Prices and Production

The Road to Serfdom

Individualism and Economic Order

The Counter-Revolution of Science

The Sensory Order

The Constitution of Liberty

Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Law, Legislation and Liberty

New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas

The Fatal Conceit

Quotes

1920s–1930s

• All economic activity is carried out through time. Every individual economic process occupies a certain time, and all linkages between economic processes necessarily involve longer or shorter periods of time.
  • "Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and Movement in the Value of Money" (1928)

• The attack on economics sprang rather from a dislike of the application of scientific methods to the investigation of social problems. The existence of a body of reasoning which prevented people from following their first impulsive reactions, and which compelled them to balance indirect effects, which could be seen only by exercising the intellect, against intense feeling caused by the direct observation of concrete suffering, then as now, occasioned intense resentment.
  • "The Trend of Economic Thinking", lecture delivered at LSE on March 1, 1933, published in Economica (May 1933)

1940s–1950s

• The reasons why the adoption of a system of central planning necessarily produces a totalitarian system are fairly simple. Whoever controls the means must decide which ends they are to serve. As under modern conditions control of economic activity means control of the material means for practically all our ends, it means control over nearly all our activities. The nature of the detailed scale of values which must guide the planning makes it impossible that it should be determined by anything like democratic means. The director of the planned system would have to impose his scale of values, his hierarchy of ends, which, if it is to be sufficient to determine the plan, must include a definite order of rank in which the status of each person is laid down. If the plan is to succeed or the planner to appear successful, the people must be made to believe that the objectives chosen are the right ones. Every criticism of the plan or the ideology underlying it must be treated as sabotage. There can be no freedom of thought, no freedom of the Press, where it is necessary that everything should be governed by a single system of thought. In theory Socialism may wish to enhance freedom, but in practice every kind of collectivism consistently carried thought must produce the characteristic features which Fascism, Nazism, and Communism have in common. Totalitarianism is nothing but consistent collectivism, the ruthless execution of the principle that 'the whole comes before the individual' and the direction of all members of society by a single will supposed to represent the 'whole'.
  • "Planning, Science and Freedom", Nature 148 (15 November 1941), also available as "Planning, Science, and Freedom," Mises Daily (Auburn, AL: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 27 September 2010)

• The treatment of the South Tirolese by the Italians, even before the advent of Fascism worse than anything known until then in modern times in any part of Western or Central Europe, has made the population more unwilling than ever to endure it further.
  • Protesting against the Allies' decision to hand South Tyrol back to Italy; letter to The Times (22 December 1945), p. 5

The Road to Serfdom (1944)

• Conservatism, though a necessary element in any stable society, is not a social program; in its paternalistic, nationalistic and power adoring tendencies it is often closer to socialism than true liberalism; and with its traditionalistic, anti-intellectual, and often mystical propensities it will never, except in short periods of disillusionment, appeal to the young and all those others who believe that some changes are desirable if this world is to become a better place.
  • p. xi

• The more the state "plans" the more difficult planning becomes for the individual.
  • Chapter 6: Planning and the Rule of Law

The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (1955)

• The mechanism by which the interaction of democratic decisions and their implementation by the experts often produces results which nobody has desired is a subject which would deserve much more careful attention than it usually receives.
  • Lecture I. Freedom and the Rule of Law: A Historical Survey - 1. Principles and Drift in Democratic Process

• Yet, though the French Revolution was so largely inspired by the ideal of the Rule of Law, it is questionable whether it really helped the advance towards that ideal. In its course too many different aspirations gained influence which it was difficult to reconcile with that ideal.
  • Lecture II. Liberalism and Administration: The Rechtsstaat - 7. Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution

• What all this amounts to, then, is that the Rule of Law requires that administrative discretion in coercive action (i.e., in interfering with the person and property of the private citizen) must always be subject to review by an independent court which is not an instrument of, or even privy to, the aims of current governmental policy; that its review must in all such instances extend to the substance of the administrative act and not merely to the question whether it was infra or ultra vires; and that, if such a court finds that the rights of private citizens have been infringed, it will assess damages just as if the right of this person had been violated by another private citizen. This, in addition to the familiar requirements of generality, equality, and certainty of the law is really the crux of the matter, the decisive point on which it depends whether the Rule of Law prevails or not.
  • Lecture III. The Safeguards of Individual Liberty - 19. Fundamental Rights and the Protected Private Sphere

• I believe that the main lesson which our generation has learnt is that we must find a new limit for the activities of government, a limit which leaves ample scope for sensible experimentation but which secures the freedom of the individual as the mainspring of all social and political activity. The whole purpose of these lectures has been to suggest that we can find such a limit if we are willing to revive and develop the ancient ideal of the Rule of Law.
  • Lecture IV. The Decline of the Rule of Law - 25. The Task for Liberty- Loving Statesmen

1960s–1970s

[Apartheid] appears to be a clear and even extreme instance of that discrimination between different individuals which seems to me to be incompatible with the reign of liberty. The essence of what I said [in The Constitution of Liberty] was really the fact that the laws under which government can use coercion are equal for all responsible adult members of that society. Any kind of discrimination — be it on grounds of religion, political opinion, race, or whatever it is — seems to be incompatible with the idea of freedom under the law.

Experience has shown that separate never is equal and cannot be equal.

• [Apartheid law in South Africa] appears to be a clear and even extreme instance of that discrimination between different individuals which seems to me to be incompatible with the reign of liberty. The essence of what I said [in The Constitution of Liberty] was really the fact that the laws under which government can use coercion are equal for all responsible adult members of that society. Any kind of discrimination — be it on grounds of religion, political opinion, race, or whatever it is — seems to be incompatible with the idea of freedom under the law. Experience has shown that separate never is equal and cannot be equal.
  • "Conversation with Systematic Liberalism," Forum (September 1961).

• Since the value of freedom rests on the opportunities it provides for unforeseen and unpredictable actions, we will rarely know what we lose through a particular restriction of freedom.
  • “Principles or Expediency?” Toward Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises on the Occasion of his 90th Birthday (29 September 1971)

• What I expect is that inflation will drive the Western countries into a planned economy via price controls. Nobody will dare to stop inflation because to discontinue inflation will inevitably cause extensive unemployment. So assuming inflation stops it will quickly be resumed. People will find they can't live with constantly rising prices and will try to control it by price controls and that of course is the end of the market system and the end of the free political order. So I think it will be via the attempt to regress the effects of a continued inflation that the free market and free institutions will disappear. It may still take ten years, but it doesn't matter much for me because in ten years I hope I shall be dead.
  • "Economics, Politics and Freedom: An Interview with F. A. Hayek", Reason (February 1975), p. 12, quoted in Alan Ebenstein, Friedrich Hayek: A Biography (2001), p. 258

• Perhaps I'm unrealistic. As long as people do not fully realize the danger of inflation, they may well pressure for more inflation as a short-term remedy for evils. Though we may well be driven into more, until people have learned the lesson, but that means that inflation may still do more of a great deal of harm, before it will be cured.
  • Interview on "Meet the Press" (22 June 1975)

• The sentence, 'stopping the printing presses,' is a figurative expression, because it is being done now by creating credit by the Federal Reserve System. But this is government action — all inflation is ultimately the result of activities which government determines and can control. And all inflations have been stopped in the past by the government stopping creating money, or preventing the central bank from creating more money. May I add just one thing? See, all inflations have been stopped by people who created or believed in a very naive form of the Quantity Theory, and acted on that. It may be wrong, but it is the only adequate theory effective to stop an inflation.
  • Interview on "Meet the Press" (22 June 1975)

• May one who has devoted a large part of his life to the study of the history and the principles of liberalism point out that a party that keeps a socialist government in power clearly has lost all title to the name “Liberal”. Certainly no liberal can in future vote “Liberal”.
  • On the Lib–Lab pact; letter to The Times (31 March 1977), p. 15

• I've always doubted that the socialists had a leg to stand on intellectually. They have improved their argument somehow, but once you begin to understand that prices are an instrument of communication and guidance which embody more information than we directly have, the whole idea that you can bring about the same order based on the division of labor by simple direction falls to the ground. Similarly, the idea [that] you can arrange for distributions of incomes which correspond to some conception of merit or need. If you need prices, including the prices of labor, to direct people to go where they are needed, you cannot have another distribution except the one from the market principle. I think that intellectually there is just nothing left of socialism.
  • Interview with Thomas W. Hazlett in May of 1977, as published in "The Road to Serfdom, Forseeing the Fall", in Reason magazine (July 1992)

• When will the British public at last learn to understand that there is no salvation for Britain until the special privileges granted to the trade unions by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 are revoked? ... There can indeed be little doubt to a detached observer that the privileges then granted to the trade unions have become the chief source of Britain's economic decline.
  • Letter to The Times (21 July 1977), p. 15

• What is at issue is not union membership but compulsory union membership and not the right to strike but the right to compel others to strike. There is no need for any other explanation of why the British economy is decaying and the German highly prosperous. The trade unions, being politically sacrosanct, have been allowed to destroy the British economy, and since even somebody as sympathetic to labour as Lady Wootton has told us that “it is in fact the business of a union to be anti-social”, it is high time that somebody had the courage to eradicate that cancer of the British economy.
  • Letter (28 July 1977) printed in The Times (2 August 1977), p. 11

• What struck me most in this conversation was a radical passion for truthfulness in everything (which I came to know as a characteristic vogue among the young Viennese intellectuals of the generation immediately preceding mine only in the following university years). This truthfulness became almost a fashion in that border group between the purely Jewish and the purely Gentile parts of the intelligentsia in which I came so much to move. It meant much more than truth in speech. One had to "live" truth and not tolerate any pretence in oneself or others. It sometimes produced outright rudeness and, certainly, unpleasantness. Every convention was dissected and every conventional form exposed as fraud. Wittgenstein merely carried this further in applying it to himself. I sometimes felt that he took a perverse pleasure in discovering falsehood in his own feelings and that he was constantly trying to purge himself of all fraud.
  • "Remembering My Cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein", Encounter (August 1977). Page 20.

• The next time I met Ludwig Wittgenstein was in the spring of 1928 when the economist Dennis Robertson, who was taking me for a walk through the Fellows' Gardens of Trinity College, Cambridge, suddenly decided to change course because on the top of a little rise he perceived the form of the philosopher draped over a deckchair.  He evidently stood rather in awe of him, and he did not wish to disturb him.
  • "Remembering My Cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein", Encounter (August 1977). Page 21.

• I have arrived at the conviction that the neglect by economists to discuss seriously what is really the crucial problem of our time is due to a certain timidity about soiling their hands by going from purely scientific questions into value questions. This is a belief deliberately maintained by the other side because if they admitted that the issue is not a scientific question, they would have to admit that their science is antiquated and that, in academic circles, it occupies the position of astrology and not one that has any justification for serious consideration in scientific discussion. It seems to me that socialists today can preserve their position in academic economics merely by the pretense that the differences are entirely moral questions about which science cannot decide.
  • Conversation at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. (9 February 1978); published in [A Conversation with Friedrich A. Von Hayek: Science and Socialism (1979)

• I suggested before that the whole of economic history could be rewritten in terms of this gradual suppression of the primitive in­stincts by what we very mistakenly call “artificial” rules. Of course, they are not in the strict sense artificial. Nobody ever invented them. They were not the result of design. The new manners of conduct were not adopted because anybody thought they were better. They were adopted because somebody who acted on them profited from it and his group gained from it, and so these rules, without anybody under­ standing them—that is very important for the later part of my argu­ment—without anybody understanding in what way they benefited their community, gradually came to be generally accepted.
  • Conversation at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. (9 February 1978); published in [A Conversation with Friedrich A. Von Hayek: Science and Socialism (1979)

• There can be no doubt that our innate moral emotions and instincts were acquired in the hundreds of thousand years—probably half a million years—in which Homo sapiens lived in small hunting and gathering groups and developed a physiological constitution which governed his innate instincts. These instincts are still very strong in us. Yet civilization developed by our gradually learning cultural rules which were trans­mitted by teaching and which served largely to restrain and suppress some of those natural instincts.
  • Conversation at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. (9 February 1978); published in [A Conversation with Friedrich A. Von Hayek: Science and Socialism (1979)

• Nobody who has lived through the rise of the violent anti-Semitism which led to Hitler can refuse Mrs. Thatcher admiration for her courageous and outspoken warning. When I grew up in Vienna the established Jewish families were a generally respected group and all decent people would frown upon the occasional anti-Jewish outbursts of a few popular politicians. It was the sudden influx of large numbers of Galician and Polish Jews [during World War I] … which in a short period changed the attitude. They were too visibly different to be readily absorbed.
  • Letter to The Times after Thatcher claimed that British people were afraid of being "swamped" by people of a different culture. (11 February 1978), p. 15

• A limited democracy might indeed be the best protector of individual liberty and be better than any other form of limited government, but an unlimited democracy is probably worse than any other form of unlimited government, because its government loses the power even to do what it thinks right if any group on which its majority depends thinks otherwise. If Mrs. Thatcher said that free choice is to be exercised more in the market place than in the ballot box, she has merely uttered the truism that the first is indispensable for individual freedom, while the second is not: free choice can at least exist under a dictatorship that can limit itself but not under the government of an unlimited democracy which cannot.
  • Letter to The Times (11 July 1978), p. 15

• I have certainly never contended that generally authoritarian governments are more likely to secure individual liberty than democratic ones, but rather the contrary. This does not mean, however, that in some historical circumstances personal liberty may not have been better protected under an authoritarian than democratic government. (...) More recently I have not been able to find a single person even in much maligned Chile who did not agree that personal freedom was much greater under Pinochet than it had been under Allende. Nor have I heard any sensible person claim that in the principalities of Monaco or Lichtenstein, which I am told are not precisely democratic, personal liberty is smaller than anywhere else!
  • Letter to The Times (3 August 1978), p. 15

• She was a very good-looking woman, and extremely intelligent. But she wasn’t really very female; she had too much of a male intelligence.
  • Conversation with Alchian (1978); About Vera Lutz, published in Nobel Prize-Winning Economist: Friedrich A. von Hayek (1983), p. 363

• I don’t have many strong dislikes. I admit that as a teacher—I have no racial prejudices in general—but there were certain types, and conspicuous among them the Near Eastern populations, which I still dislike because they are fundamentally dishonest. And I must say dishonesty is a thing I intensely dislike. It was a type which, in my childhood in Austria, was described as Levantine, typical of the people of the eastern Mediterranean. But I encountered it later, and I have a profound dislike for the typical Indian students at the London School of Economics, which I admit are all one type—Bengali moneylender sons. They are to me a detestable type, I admit, but not with any racial feeling. I have found a little of the same amongst the Egyptians —basically a lack of honesty in them. If I advise speaking about honesty, I think honesty is really the best expression of what I call the morals of a civilized society. Primitive man lacks a conception of honesty.
  • Conversation with Chitester (1978); published in Nobel Prize-Winning Economist: Friedrich A. von Hayek (1983), p. 490

• The misconception that costs determined prices prevented economists for a long time from recognizing that it was prices which operated as the indispensable signals telling producers what costs it was worth expending on the production of the various commodities and services, and not the other way around.  It was the costs which they had expended which determined the prices of things produced.

  It was this crucial insight which finally broke through and established itself about a hundred years ago through the so-called marginal revolution in economics.

  The chief insight gained by modern economists is that the market is essentially an ordering mechanism, growing up without anybody wholly understanding it, that enables us to utilize widely dispersed information about the significance of circumstances of which we are mostly ignorant.  However, the various planners (and not only the planners in the socialist camp) and dirigists have still not yet grasped this.

  • "Coping with Ignorance," The Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, Originally published in Imprimis 7 (Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College, July 1978).  Later reprinted in Cheryl A. Yurchis (ed.) Champions of Freedom (The Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series Vol. 5; Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 1979).

• The social sciences building at the University of Chicago indeed still bears since it was built 40 years ago on its outside an inscription taken from the famous physicist Lord Kelvin: "When you cannot measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory." I will admit that that may be true, but it is certainly not scientific to insist on measurement where you don't know what your measurements mean. There are cases where measurements are not relevant. What has done much damage to microeconomics is striving for a pseudo-exactness by imitating methods of the physical sciences which have to deal with what are fundamentally much more simple phenomena. And the assumption that it is possible to ascertain all the relevant particular facts still completely dominates the alternative methods of dealing with our constitutional ignorance, which economists have tried to overcome. This of course, is what has come to be called macroeconomics as distinct from microeconomics.
  • "Coping with Ignorance," The Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, Originally published in Imprimis 7 (Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College, July 1978).  Later reprinted in Cheryl A. Yurchis (ed.) Champions of Freedom (The Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series Vol. 5; Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 1979).

• It seems to me more and more that the immense efforts which during the great popularity of macroeconomics over the last thirty or forty years have been devoted to it, were largely misspent, and that if we want to be useful in the future we shall have to be content to improve and spread the admittedly limited insights which microeconomics conveys.

  I believe it is only microeconomics which enables us to understand the crucial functions of the market process: that it enables us to make effective use of information about thousands of facts of which nobody can have full knowledge.

  • "Coping with Ignorance," The Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, Originally published in Imprimis 7 (Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College, July 1978).  Later reprinted in Cheryl A. Yurchis (ed.) Champions of Freedom (The Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series Vol. 5; Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 1979).

The Constitution of Liberty (1960)

Conservatism proper is a legitimate, probably necessary, and certainly widespread attitude of opposition to drastic change. It has, since the French Revolution, for a century and a half played an important role in European politics. Until the rise of socialism its opposite was liberalism... There is nothing corresponding to this conflict in the history of the United States, because what in Europe was called ‘liberalism’ was here the common tradition on which the American polity had been built: thus the defender of the American tradition was a liberal in the European sense.

• What a free society offers to the individual is much more than what he would be able to do if only he were free.
  • p. 6.

• A society that does not recognize that each individual has values of his own which he is entitled to follow can have no respect for the dignity of the individual and cannot really know freedom.
  • p. 79.

• Freedom granted only when it is known beforehand that its effects will be beneficial is not freedom.
  • p. 83.

• Justice, like liberty and coercion, is a concept which, for the sake of clarity, ought to be confined to the deliberate treatment of men by other men.
  • p. 99.

• Conservatism proper is a legitimate, probably necessary, and certainly widespread attitude of opposition to drastic change. It has, since the French Revolution, for a century and a half played an important role in European politics. Until the rise of socialism its opposite was liberalism... There is nothing corresponding to this conflict in the history of the United States, because what in Europe was called ‘liberalism’ was here the common tradition on which the American polity had been built: thus the defender of the American tradition was a liberal in the European sense.
  • "Why I am Not a Conservative"

Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, 1976, 1979)

• The assurance of a certain minimum income for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody need fall even when he is unable to provide for himself, appears not only to be a wholly legitimate protection against a risk common to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the particular small group into which he was born.
  • Law, Legislation and Liberty, volume 3, chapter 3, p. 55 (1979)

Nobel Banquet Speech (1974)

Speech at the Nobel Banquet (10 December 1974) Full text online

• I must confess that if I had been consulted whether to establish a Nobel Prize in economics, I should have decidedly advised against it.

• I feared that such a prize, as I believe is true of the activities of some of the great scientific foundations, would tend to accentuate the swings of scientific fashion. This apprehension the selection committee has brilliantly refuted by awarding the prize to one whose views are as unfashionable as mine are.

• The Nobel Prize confers on an individual an authority which in economics no man ought to possess.
  This does not matter in the natural sciences. Here the influence exercised by an individual is chiefly an influence on his fellow experts; and they will soon cut him down to size if he exceeds his competence.
  But the influence of the economist that mainly matters is an influence over laymen: politicians, journalists, civil servants and the public generally.
  There is no reason why a man who has made a distinctive contribution to economic science should be omnicompetent on all problems of society — as the press tends to treat him till in the end he may himself be persuaded to believe.

A Conversation with Professor Friedrich A. Hayek (1979)

Conversation in 1979, published in Diego Pizano, Conversations with Great Economists (2009)

• My whole concept of economics is based on the idea that we have to explain how prices operate as signals, telling people what they ought to do in particular circumstances. The approach to this problem has been blocked by a cost or labor theory of value, which assumes that prices are determined by the technical conditions of production only. The important question is to explain how the interaction of a great number of people, each possessing only limited knowledge, will bring about an order that could only be achieved by deliberate direction taken by somebody who has the combined knowledge of all these individuals. However, central planning cannot take direct account of particular circumstances of time and place. Additionally, every individual has important bits of information which cannot possibly be conveyed to a central authority in statistical form. In a system in which the knowledge of relevant data is dispersed among millions of agents, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different individuals.
  Given this context, it is intellectually not satisfactory to attempt to establish causal relations between aggregates or averages in the manner in which the discipline of macroeconomics has attempted to do. Individuals do not make decisions on the basis of partial knowledge of magnitudes such as the total amount of production, or the total quantity of money. Aggregative theorizing leads nowhere.

• I think the basic misconception is to speak of the so-called “best” allocation of resources. What is the best? In common economics it is defined as what would be if we knew everything. Economists operate with the fictitious assumption that all the relevant data is known, but this is totally unrealistic. Nobody knows all the data. What we have is widely dispersed knowledge, which cannot be concentrated in one mind. To call the situation—which would use all the knowledge available—“optimal” is nonsense because it is by definition a non-achievable solution. Our problem is not the full utilization of all knowledge but the best use we can achieve with any known institutional structure. In that sense, some oligopolistic (and even monopolistic situations), represent the best possible utilization of knowledge that we can achieve. Even the action of a monopolist can be extremely beneficial.

• There is no doubt, and in this I agree with Milton Friedman, that once the Crash had occurred, the Federal Reserve System pursued a silly deflationary policy. I am not only against inflation but I am also against deflation! So, once again, a badly programmed monetary policy prolonged the depression! So, once again, a badly programmed monetary policy prolonged the depression. One consequence of this policy was, of course, the fact that confidence was destroyed.

1980s and later

It is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible for a democracy to govern with a total lack of liberalism. Personally I prefer a liberal dictator to democratic government lacking liberalism.

I’m all for reduction of government expenditures but to anticipate it by reducing the rate of taxation before you have reduced expenditure is a very risky thing to do.

And since any inflation, however modest at first, can help employment only so long as it accelerates, adopted as a means of reducing unemployment, it will do so for any length of time only while it accelerates.

We live in a world where three moral traditions are in constant conflict, the innate ones, the traditional ones, and the intellectually designed ones, and ultimately, all our political conflicts of this time can be reduced as affected by a conflict between free moral tradition of a different nature, not only of different content.

• It seems to me that the future of peaceful international relations and the safety of persons in foreign countries would have been much better served if, after the Iranian Government placed itself outside the community of nations by approving the holding captive of the personnel of the United States embassy, the United States Government had at once sent an ultimatum saying that, unless every single member of the embassy staff were within 48 hours handed over unharmed to representatives of the United States Government at some place outside Iran, bombs would be falling at an increasing rate at the seat of the Iranian Government.
  • On the Iran hostage crisis; letter to The Times (12 January 1980), p. 13

• The newfangled word monetarism means of course no more than the good old “quantity theory of money”, as it was formulated in modern times by the late Professor Irving Fisher and reformulated by Professor Milton Friedman. Of this I said nearly 50 years ago in the first lecture I delivered in this country that “from a practical point of view, it would be one of the worst things which could befall us if the general public should ever again cease to believe in the elementary propositions of the quantity theory”. This was, however, unfortunately brought about by the seductive theories of Lord Keynes. I then said that it was in many respects a crude over-simplification, but the irrefutable chief content is still that inflation is always and everywhere the effect of an excessive supply of money and that it can be cured only by a restriction of its supply.
  • Letter to The Times (5 March 1980), p. 17

• The knowledge of facts is widely dispersed. We want to make use of knowledge possessed by millions of individual people, which they can only use if they are fed signals about the general situation. You can't reverse it you can't possibly concentrate this knowledge. The whole order of international cooperation has been built on such a signalling system, where signals tell you about facts which nobody knows concrete in their totality, and I may add such signals you cannot correct - you can not correct signals which inform you about circumstances you don't know.
  • in The Levin interviews - Friedrich Hayek (31st May 1980)

• Both altruism and solidarity are very strong instincts which guided man in the small group. We were serving known other persons when his efforts were directed to the needs of familiar people. Now we have grown as rich as we are because we have replaced this by a system where we no longer work for the known needs of known other people, and no longer use the known assistance of other people, but where our effort is completely guided by price signals, which for the individual means that I must use my resources for the maximum success of what resources is sacrificed for the purpose, but the justification is not my benefit but in this way I benefit my fellow man most. So it does happen that so far as commercial activities economic activities are concerned we will benefit our fellow man most if we are guided solely by the striving for gain. We are then completely free how to use what we have earned and there of course the desire for being altruistic come in very strongly, but not in the ordering principle of our society.
  • in The Levin interviews - Friedrich Hayek (31st May 1980)

• I did say in print, in February, 1929 that there was no hope for economic recovery in Europe before American interest rates came down. That wouldn’t be until the American boom collapsed — which was likely to happen within the next few months.And this did, in fact, happen in October 1929.
  What made me expect this, of course, was one of my main theoretical beliefs — that an inflationary boom cannot be maintained indefinitely. I was sure that a very unstable situation was created by the artificial prolongation of the boom in 1927, when the Federal Reserve tried to stave off a collapse by credit expansion.
  • Interview in Silver & Gold Report, Vol. V, No. 20, (Late October 1980)

• I don’t believe we’re in for a crash now. It's much more likely that government will just conceal the continuation of inflation by price controls. But if anything is worse than an open inflation, it’s a repressed inflation. What you’re likely to get is not a violent deflation but increasing stagnation of productivity.
  • Interview in Silver & Gold Report, Vol. V, No. 20, (Late October 1980)

• If the world as a whole returned to the gold standard there would be such fluctuations in the value of gold that it would very soon prove impractical.
  Today an international gold standard could only mean that a few countries would maintain a real gold standard. The other countries would hang on to the system through a gold exchange standard — where the currency isn't really redeemable in gold but the government attempts to keep a fixed rate between its currency and gold.
  • Interview in Silver & Gold Report, Vol. V, No. 20, (Late October 1980)

• If a big country like the United States did return to the gold standard, it would start a great deflation. Most likely the government couldn't stick to it for long. They'd switch the policy to some halfway measure like a gold exchange standard.
  • Interview in Silver & Gold Report, Vol. V, No. 20, (Late October 1980)

• The advice I would give is: If you have the courage to do so, don't feel patriotic in monetary matters. Choose the money which helps you best.
  • Interview in Silver & Gold Report, Vol. V, No. 20, (Late October 1980)

• When I look at the world, I sometimes feel that here in Germany one may still be in some sort of lifeboat that can hope to keep afloat when the rest of the world goes bust. German and Switzerland and perhaps Austria and Belgium have the few relatively stable currencies in the world.
  • Interview in Silver & Gold Report, Vol. V, No. 20, (Late October 1980)

• There is no salvation for Britain unless the special privileges granted to the trade unions in 1906 are revoked. The average level of real wages of British workers would undoubtedly be higher, and their chances of finding employment better, if the wages of different occupations were again determined by the market and all limitations on the work an individual is allowed to do were removed.
  • "Trade Unions — The Biggest Obstacle", Economic Affairs (October 1980)

• It should surprise no one that the lost generation of British economists who had succumbed to the teachings of Lord Keynes should form a panicky mob when a reversal of the policies they had inspired reveals the damage they have done. ... Following their advice has induced a structure of employment that can be maintained only by accelerating inflation but will collapse only when it becomes a gallop and destroys any possibility of a rational use of resources. Nobody has ever claimed that so long as it is necessary to reduce inflation to get out of this vicious circle the effect can be anything but to destroy the particular employments created by past inflation. Only after inflation has been brought to a full stop can the market be expected to guide workers to jobs which can be maintained without accelerating inflation. All those who plead for “mild” inflation and oppose “too much” inflation are merely preparing the ground for a later depression.
  • Letter on the 364 economists who protested against the 1981 United Kingdom budget, printed in The Times (4 April 1981), p. 13

• Well, I would say that, as long-term institutions, I am totally against dictatorships. But a dictatorship may be a necessary system for a transitional period. At times it is necessary for a country to have, for a time, some form or other of dictatorial power. As you will understand, it is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible for a democracy to govern with a total lack of liberalism. Personally I prefer a liberal dictator to democratic government lacking liberalism. My personal impression — and this is valid for South America — is that in Chile, for example, we will witness a transition from a dictatorial government to a liberal government. And during this transition it may be necessary to maintain certain dictatorial powers, not as something permanent, but as a temporary arrangement.
  • Interview in El Mercurio (1981)

• I cannot help but protest in the strongest possible terms against the cartoon on page 3 of your publication of the 30th of December equating the present governments of Poland and Chile. It can only be explained by complete ignorance of the facts or by the systematically promoted socialist calumnies of the present situation in Chile, which I had not expected the F.A.Z. to fall for. I believe that all the participants in the Mont Pelerin Society conference held a few weeks ago in Chile would agree with me that you owe the Chilean government a humble apology for such twisting of the facts. Any Pole lucky enough to escape to Chile could consider himself fortunate.
  • Letter to the editor of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, on a cartoon comparing Pinochet's Chile to Jaruzelski's Poland, which was published on 6 January 1982

• The illiterate expression ‘given data’ constantly recurs in Lange. It appears to have an irresistable attraction to mathematical economists because it doubly assures them that they know what they do not know. It seems to bewitch them into making assertions about the real world for which they have no empirical justification whatever.
  • "Two Pages of Fiction: The Impossibility of Socialist Calculation", Economic Affairs (1982)

• What the planning authority would have to know would not be the mere totals but the distinct, peculiar conditions prevailing in each enterprise which affect the information about values transmitted through market prices but would be completely lost in any statistical information about quantities that might reach the authority from time to time.
  • "Two Pages of Fiction: The Impossibility of Socialist Calculation", Economic Affairs (1982)

• There mere idea that the planning authority could ever possess a complete inventory of the amounts and qualities of all the different materials and instruments of production of which the manager of a particular plant will know or be able to find out makes the whole proposal a somewhat comic fiction. Once this is recognised it becomes obvious that what prices ought to be can never be determined without relying on competitive markets.
  • "Two Pages of Fiction: The Impossibility of Socialist Calculation", Economic Affairs (1982)

• A reconsideration of the discussion in which I took an active part more than 40 years ago has left me with a rather depressing view of the somewhat shameful state of what has become an established part of economic science, the subject of 'economic systems'. It appears to me that in this subject political attractiveness has been preserved by the flimsiest of arguments. The kindest thing one can say is that some well-meaning people have allowed themselves to be deceived by the vague and thoughtless language commonly used by specialists in the theory of these issues.
  • "Two Pages of Fiction: The Impossibility of Socialist Calculation", Economic Affairs (1982)

• These morals, or better this moral tradition, is the result of an evolution which occurred parallel to, and yet distinct from both biological evolution on the one hand, and the evolution of our intellect on the other hand.
  • "Individual and Collective Aims", delivered on 12 March 1982, published in Susan Mendus, David Edwards (ed.) On Toleration (1987)

• On the scale on which [tax cutting] is being tried, I'm a little apprehensive. I'm all for reduction of government expenditures but to anticipate it by reducing the rate of taxation before you have reduced expenditure is a very risky thing to do.
  • in "Business People; A Nobel Winner Assesses Reagan", The New York Times (1 December 1982)

• My life has been dominated by my differences with John Maynard Keynes. That turns almost wholly on the - I believe, false - conviction that there is a simple relationship between aggregate demand for consumer goods and the volume of employment. Keynes was one of the most intelligent people I knew but he understood very little economics. He must not be blamed for his disciples. He knew the danger of inflation.
  • in "Business People; A Nobel Winner Assesses Reagan", The New York Times (1 December 1982)

• [Milton Friedman] believes in an oversimplified quantitative relationship between a measurable quantity of money and the price level. You must leave it to the discretion of the central bank to so adjust the supply of ultimate cash reserves as to keep the price level stable.
  • in "Business People; A Nobel Winner Assesses Reagan", The New York Times (1 December 1982)

• The social product which is now maintaining a human population of this world four or five hundred times as large as that which man could achieve in the natural hunting and gathering stage is owed only to the division of labor, skills, and knowledge. This division could never have been designed or planned, but it arose through and is now maintained by the guiding service of competitive market prices and wages that tell each person where its efforts can make the largest contribution to the total. These self-generating signals, which inform the individuals about the combined efforts of thousands of events of which they can have no direct information, bring about an adaptation of the individual efforts to the unknown. No central direction could achieve this adaptation because the knowledge of all the facts of which the market takes account is spread among thousands and cannot be known to any central authority. It is, of course, impossible to improve signals when one does not know what determines them. Wealth, which social justice would like to distribute as a reward for merit and need, is, therefore, due to the circumstance that the direction of individual efforts is guided by a choice between returns which depends largely on accidental circumstances of time and place and is effected but not conclusively determined by what the individual can know or do. Thus, the wealth which the advocates of social justice want to redistribute would not exist if social justice reigned. Social justice is a fraud, a promise to distribute what one would not have if one followed its bidding. Wealth just would not be there or would rapidly disappear if the ordering by the principles of the market that now guide its production were replaced by some others which would give to each that to which he imagines himself to be entitled.
  • "The Muddle of the Middle", in Svetozar Pejovič (ed.), Philosophical and economic foundations of capitalism (1983)

• We have found a method of creating an order of human co–operation which far exceeds the limits of our knowledge. We are led to do things by circumstances of which we are largely unaware. We do not know the needs which we satisfy, nor do we know the sources of the things which we get. We stand in an enormous framework into which we fit ourselves by obeying certain rules of conduct that we have never made and never understood, but which have their reason.
  • "Our Moral Heritage", The Heritage Lectures (1983)

• We do not owe our morals to our intelligence: we owe them to the fact that some groups uncomprehendingly accepted certain rules of conduct — the rules of private property, of honesty, and of the family — that enabled the groups practising them to prosper, multiply, and gradually to displace the others.
  • "Our Moral Heritage", The Heritage Lectures (1983)

• Our morality itself is the result of a process of cultural selection. Those things survive which enable the species to multiply.
  • "Our Moral Heritage", The Heritage Lectures (1983)

• I believe you will be shocked by my stating this so bluntly because we are still guided instinctively by those inherited "natural" emotions. But I think we must recognize that we have become a worldwide, peaceful, and prosperous society by having learned to disregard those natural instincts and to follow instead certain abstract rules of honesty—rules establishing private property and ultimately codified in the form of private law. It is the rules of property and contract on which the growth of a worldwide, peaceful, and prosperous society was based. All these are traditional rules that evolved by a process of selection, which made those groups who followed the new rules more prosperous than other groups, and which thus came gradually to govern the civilised part of the world. Those communities who adopted the new rules and, in doing so, infringed upon deeply embedded natural feelings became the successful ones, the ones who multiplied because they were more prosperous and were able to attract people from other groups.
  • "The Reactionary Character of the Socialist Conception", published in Knowledge, Evolution, and Society (1983)

• In a sense, we all are socialists. We are still governed by feelings that are based on what was necessary in the small group of known people among whom each had to aim at fulfilling the needs of persons he knew; where he had to collaborate with a definite group of fellows, who were given to him and whom he could not choose, to pursue common purposes. Our instincts still tell us to strive to serve the known needs of known people and that our pleasure in life is derived from the consciousness that we follow a set of common purposes with people whom we know and who share our environment.
  • "The Reactionary Character of the Socialist Conception", published in Knowledge, Evolution, and Society (1983)

• Our whole modern society, based on a far-ranging division of labour, is, however, essentially dependent on two factors that conflict with our natural instincts. The first is the assumption, implicit but not understood, that we can do more good to unknown people if we follow the impersonal signals of the market, which enable us to serve the needs of people whom we do not know and to make use of opportunities and facilities with which we have no direct acquaintance. The second is that for this purpose we can follow our own individual aims with freely chosen associates and are not bound to serve the concrete ends of the group into which we were born.
  • "The Reactionary Character of the Socialist Conception", published in Knowledge, Evolution, and Society (1983)

• I don't know what monetarism is. If monetarism just means a good old-fashioned quantity theory, of course it has not failed. If it means the particular version of Milton Friedman, I think it has because he imagines that he can achieve — ascertain — a clear quantity relationship between a measurable quantity of money and the price level. I don't think that is possible. In fact, just about 40 years ago in the opening sentences of my book, Prices and Production, I wrote that it would be a great misfortune if people ever cease to believe in the quantity theory of money. It would be even worse ever to believe it literally. And that's exactly what Milton Friedman does.
  • "Interview with F. A. Hayek", in Cato Policy Report (February 1983)

• The human groups have been selected for the effects of their habitual practices, effects of which the individuals were not and could not be aware. Customs are mostly group properties, beneficial only if they are common properties of its individual members but referring to reciprocal action. Morals have not only been designed by man, but man also usually does not understand their reason.
  • "The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science", in The Essence of Hayek (1984)

• All the paradigms of culturally evolved institutions, morals, exchange, and money refer to such practices whose benefits transcend the individuals who practice them in the particular instances. The result is that whole groups may be helped by them to expand into what I shall call extended orders, through the effects of practices of which the individuals are not aware. Such practices can lead to the formation of orderly structures far exceeding the perception of those whose actions produce them. They make possible the adaptation of such actions to unknown circumstances and lead to the formation of an indefinitely expansible order which can develop only through group selection, that is, a selection of groups for common attributes possessed by them.
  • "The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science", in The Essence of Hayek (1984)

• It is no exaggeration to say that the central aim of socialism is to discredit those traditional morals which keep us alive.
  • "The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science", in The Essence of Hayek (1984)

• And since any inflation, however modest at first, can help employment only so long as it accelerates, adopted as a means of reducing unemployment, it will do so for any length of time only while it accelerates. "Mild" steady inflation cannot help—it can lead only to outright inflation. That inflation at a constant rate soon ceases to have any stimulating effect, and in the end merely leaves us with a backlog of delayed adaptations, is the conclusive argument against the "mild" inflation represented as beneficial even in standard economics textbooks.
  • 1980s Unemployment and the Unions: Essays on the Impotent Price Structure of Britain and Monopoly in the Labour Market (1984)

• It seems to me that my original plan is right, but I am afraid that I’ve come to the conclusion that politically, it is completely Utopian. Governments will never allow monetary competition, and even bankers do not understand the idea because they have all grown up in the system which is so completely dependent on central banks. So I think we need a roundabout way. After all, in the modern world, currency is no longer the most important money. Credit and credit cards are substitutes. While governments can stop people from issuing money, they can hardly stop them from opening accounts in something unless they introduce a complete system of exchange control. I do not expect that any bank will understand this idea. But I hope that one of the big dealers in raw materials will be prepared to open accounts which will be redeemable in so much of current moneys as are necessary to buy this list of raw materials. Through these accounts he can make his unit—call it the “solid”—the standard unit without it ever being used in circulation. People very soon will begin to keep their accounts in “solids”—the only thing which is trustworthy. Although it’s a thing where many people can compete, most of them will probably choose the same list of raw materials. If one major firm will start this, others will imitate it. So I think we can forget about existing money and existing banks, and gradually open a system of accounts which will displace the government money.
  • Interview with James U. Blanchard III, in Cato Policy Report (May/June 1984))

• I don't like criticizing Milton Friedman not only because he is an old friend but because, outside of monetary theory, we are in complete agreement. Our general views on what is desired and what is not are almost identical until we get on to money. But if I told him what I said before, that I very much doubt whether monetary policy has ever done anything good, he would disagree. He personally is convinced that a good monetary policy is a foundation for everything.
  • Interview with James U. Blanchard III, in Cato Policy Report (May/June 1984))

• I don't believe that we shall ever have a good money again before we take the thing out of the hands of government, and since we can't take them violently out of the hands of government, all we can do is by some sly roundabout way introduce something they can't stop.
  • Interview with James U. Blanchard III, 1984. This quote is from the video recording but does not appear in the transcript (at 19:23 in the youtube copy here).

• Those who suffer from this monopoly should form a libertarian anti-labour union movement of workers directed against what has long become a deceptive farce favouring an elite that has gained dominance in a party wrongly claiming to represent the interest of all workers. Once it is recognized that the unions prevent people from getting jobs, such a movement may readily spread.
  • "Jobs: the basic truths we have cast aside", The Times (7 August 1984), p. 10

• The socialist argument continues despite its many defeats―on the impossibility of economic calculation under collectivism, the fallacious claims for the use of markets under socialism, the incompatibility of liberty and state direction of the economy, and many others. The argument is being won by the new liberals of the late 20th century. But many people still do not understand it. And most on the Left continue to resist it.
  • "Socialism, Liberalism, and the Young" in Arthur Sheldon (ed.), The ‘New Right’ Enlightenment: The Spectre that Haunts the Left (1985)

• Our basic problem is that we have three levels, I would say, of moral beliefs. We have the first instance, our intuitive moral feelings which are adapted to the small, person-to-person society where we act for people whom we know and are served by people whom we know. Then, we have a society governed by moral traditions which, unlike what modern rationalists believe, are not intellectual discoveries of men who designed them, but as a result of a persons, which I now prefer to describe as term of 'group selection.' Those groups who had accidentally developed such as the tradition of private property and the family who did succeed, but never understood this. So we owe our present extended order of human cooperation very largely to a moral tradition which the intellectual does not approve of, because it has never been intellectually designed and it has to compete with a third level of moral beliefs, those which the morals which the intellectuals designed in the hope that they can better satisfy man's instincts than the traditional morals to do. And we live in a world where three moral traditions are in constant conflict, the innate ones, the traditional ones, and the intellectually designed ones, and ultimately, all our political conflicts of this time can be reduced as affected by a conflict between free moral tradition of a different nature, not only of different content.
  • in 1985 interview with John O'Sullivan

• I mean, it became particularly acute because Keynes, against his intentions, had stimulated the development of macroeconomics. And I was convinced that not only his particular conclusions, but the whole foundation of macroeconomics was wrong.
  So I wanted to demonstrate that we had to return to microeconomics, that this whole prejudice supported by the natural scientists that could deduce anything from measurable magnitudes, the effects of aggregates and averages, came to fascinate me much more. I felt in a way, that the thing which I am now prepared to do, I don’t know as there’s anybody else who can do this particular task. And I rather hoped that what I had done in capital theory would be continued by others. This was a new opening which was much more fascinating. The other would have meant working for a result which I already knew, but had to prove it. Which was very dull.
  The other thing was an open problem: How does economics really look like when you recognize it as the prototype of a new kind of science of complex phenomena which could not employ the simple model of mechanics or physics, but had to deal with what then I described as mere pattern predictions, certain limited prediction. That was so much more fascinating as an intellectual problem.
  • In a 1985 interview with Gary North and Mark Skousen, in Hayek on Hayek (1994)

• Altruism is an instinct we've inherited from the small society where we knew for whom we work, whom we serve. When you pass from this, as I like to call it, 'concrete society', where we are guided by what we see, to the abstract society which far transcends our range of vision, it becomes necessary that we are guided not by the knowledge of the effect of what we do, but by some abstract symbols. Now, the only symbol which tells us where we can make the best contribution is profit. And in fact by pursuing profit, we are as altruistic as we can possibly be, because we extend our concern to people who are beyond our range of personal conception. This is a condition which makes it possible to produce what I call an extended order, an order which is not determined by our aim, by our knowing what are the most urgent needs, but by an impersonal mechanism which by a system of communication puts a label on certain things which is fully impersonal.
  • 1985 interview with John O'Sullivan

• I am now profoundly convinced of what I had only hinted at before, namely, that the struggle between the advocates of a free society and the advocates of the socialist system is not a moral but an intellectual conflict. Thus socialists have been led by a very peculiar development to revive certain primitive instincts and feelings which in the course of hundreds of years had been practically suppressed by commercial or mercantile morals, which by the middle of the last century had come to govern the world economy.
  • "The Moral Imperative of the Market", in The Unfinished Agenda: Essays on the Political Economy of Government Policy in Honour of Arthur Seldon (1986)

• Questions about the influence of socialism are increasingly more difficult to answer as the word socialism has so many meanings. The idea that the inequalities of incomes can be greatly reduced has come to be recognized as largely impractical. Practically all endeavours at just distribution express more or less arbitrary conceptions of what is just and the central idea of Marxian socialism of a rationalisation of the means of production has been largely abandoned as technically impracticable. I believe that in general the idea of justice is more closely met by a freely competitive market than by any deliberate allocation of income to some imagined ideal of the kind.
  • December 13, 1991, quoted in Friedrich Hayek: A Biography (2001) by Alan O. Ebenstein

• You cannot successfully use your technical knowledge unless you are a fairly educated person, and, in particular, have some knowledge of the whole field of the social sciences as well as some knowledge of history and philosophy. Of course real competence in some particular field comes first. Unless you really know your economics or whatever your special field is, you will be simply a fraud. But if you know economics and nothing else, you will be a bane to mankind, good, perhaps, for writing articles for other economists to read, but for nothing else.
  • Friedrich Hayek (1991). "On being an economist." In: W. W. Bartley and S. Kresge (eds.), The Trend of Economic Thinking; Essays on Political Economists and Economic History, Volume III, London. Routledge. p. 38

• An evil fate befall German efforts to defend the ideal of liberty in general and in the field of economics in particular, with the result that today I am almost the only survivor of a generation that set out in the wake of the First World War to devote all its energies to the preservation of a civilised society, a generation that set itself the task to build a better society in a systematic fashion and to learn to understand, and to some extent defend, a tradition that had civilised the world.
  • "The Rediscovery of Freedom: Personal Recollections" (1983), published in The Fortunes of Liberalism (1992)

• Life at Cambridge during those war years was to me particularly congenial, and it completed the process of thorough absorption in English life which, from the beginning, I had found very easy. Somehow the whole mood and intellectual atmosphere of the country had at once proved extraordinarily attractive to me, and the conditions of a war in which all my sympathies were with the English greatly speeded up the process of becoming thoroughly at home—much more than in my native Austria from which I had already become somewhat estranged during the conditions of the 1920s. While neither on my early visit to the United States nor during my later stay there or still later in Germany did I feel that I really belonged there, English ways of life seemed so naturally to accord with all my instincts and dispositions that, if it had not been for very special circumstances, I should never have wished to leave the country again. And of all the forms of life, that at one of the colleges of the old universities...still seems to me the most attractive. The evenings at the High Table and the Combinations Room at King's are among the pleasantest recollections of my life, and some of the older men I came then to know well, especially J.H.Clapham, remained, while they lived, dear friends.
  • Stephen Kresge and Leif Wenar (eds.), Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 86

The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988)

The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.

• Since only actions aimed at perceived benefit to others were, to Aristotle's mind, morally approved, actions solely for personal gain must be bad. That commercial considerations may not have affected the daily activities of most people does not mean however that over any prolonged period their very lives did not depend on the functioning of a trade that enabled them to buy essentials. That production for gain which Aristotle denounced as unnatural had -- long before his time -- already become the foundation of an extended order far transcending the known needs of other persons.
  • p. 46

• Whereas, in fact, specialised students, even after generations of effort, find it exceedingly difficult to explain such matters, and cannot agree on what are the causes or what will be the effects of particular events. The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.
  To the naive mind that can conceive of order only as the product of deliberate arrangement, it may seem absurd that in complex conditions order, and adaptation to the unknown, can be achieved more effectively by decentralizing decisions and that a division of authority will actually extend the possibility of overall order. Yet that decentralization actually leads to more information being taken into account.
  • Ch. 5: The Fatal Conceit.

• If craftsmen and blacksmiths were feared for transforming material substance, if traders were feared for transforming such intangible qualities as value, how much more will the banker be feared for the transformations he effects with the most abstract and immaterial of all economic institutions? Thus we reach the climax of the progressive replacement of the perceivable and concrete by abstract concepts shaping rules guiding activity: money and its institutions seem to be beyond the boundary of laudable and understandable physical efforts of creation, in a realm where the comprehension of the concrete ceases and incomprehensible abstractions rule.
  • p. 102

Quotes about Friedrich Hayek

In alphabetical order by author or source

I, like … others, owe him a great debt … his powerful mind … his lucid and always principled exposition have helped to broaden and deepen my understanding of the meaning and the requisites of a free society. ~ Milton Friedman

A–F

• The most important player on Ronald Reagan's economic team is Ronald Reagan. The person most responsible for creating the economic program that came to be known as Reaganomics is Reagan himself. For over twenty years he observed the American economy, read and studied the writings of some of the best economists in the world, including the giants of the free market economy — Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman — and he spoke and wrote on the economy, going through the rigorous mental discipline of explaining his thoughts to others. Over the years he made all the key decisions on the economic strategies he finally embraced. He always felt comfortable with his knowledge of the field and he was in command all the way.
  • Martin Anderson, Revolution (1988), p. 164

• At Chicago, Hayek put aside his more technical economic work for the development of a social and political theory that became in time the most ambitious and complete synthesis to emerge from the ranks of the post-war Right. Among its themes — the overriding significance of the rule of law, the need for social inequality, the function of unreflective tradition, the value of a leisured class — were many cultivated by Strauss across the campus. Neither thinker, however, ever referred to the other. Did temperamental antagonism, or intellectual indifference, dictate the silence? Whatever the case, latent tensions of outlook between them were to find expression in due course. Schmitt, on the other hand, was never far from Hayek's mind – standing for the prime example of a skilled jurist whose sophistry helped to destroy the rule of law in Germany, yet a political theorist whose stark definitions of the nature of sovereignty and the logic of party, at any rate, had to be accepted.
  • Perry Anderson, "The Intransigent Right: Michael Oakeshott, Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, Friedrich von Hayek" (1992)

• Oakeshott, whose technical theory afforded no space for the nation-state, since collective solidarity was not a principle of civil association, had – as might be expected – nothing to say about the problems of a supra-national one. Asked his view of Britain’s entry into the EEC in the early sixties, Noel Annan reports, he replied: 'I do not find it necessary to hold opinions on such matters.' Hayek, on the other hand, held firm and far-seeing ones. As early as 1939, he argued in his prophetic essay "The Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism" that transcendence of national sovereignty in a supra-national framework should be of natural advantage to a free economy, since the higher the plane on which its structural parameters were set – that is, the remoter from local faction and interest – the more insulated they would be from popular passion. In other words: the less immediately democratic the machinery of decision, the safer it was likely to be for the reproduction of capital. Of course, this was less a logical deduction than an empirical wager – that the task of constructing a supra-national popular sovereignty, capable of determining the social path of a supra-national economy, would prove impossible. That calculation has yet to be confounded, as the terms of union agreed at Maastricht – a central monetary authority for Europe, without any commensurate elected assembly – show.
  • Perry Anderson, "Constitutional Theatre: Ferdinand Mount" (1992)

• There was from the beginning a third vision of what European integration should mean, distinct from either federalist or inter-governmentalist conceptions of the Community. Its far-sighted theorist was Hayek, who even before the Second World War had envisaged a constitutional structure raised sufficiently high above the nations composing it to exclude the danger of any popular sovereignty below impinging on it. In the nation-state, electorates were perpetually subject to dirigiste and redistributive temptations, encroaching on the rights of property in the name of democracy. But once heterogeneous populations were assembled in an inter-state federation, as he called it, they would not be able to re-create the united will that was prone to such ruinous interventions. Under an impartial authority, beyond the reach of political ignorance or envy, the spontaneous order of a market economy could finally unfold without interference [...] With the abrupt deterioration in the global economic climate in the 1970s, and the general neo-liberal turn that followed in the 1980s, Hayekian doctrine was rediscovered throughout the West. The leading edge of the change came in the UK and US, with the arrival of Thatcher and Reagan. Continental Europe never produced comparably radical regimes, but the ideological atmosphere shifted steadily in the same direction. The collapse of the Soviet bloc sealed the transformation of working assumptions. By the 1990s, the Commission was openly committed to privatisation as a principle, pressed without embarrassment on candidate countries along with other democratic niceties. Its most powerful arm had become the Competition Directorate, striking out at public sector monopolies in Western and Eastern Europe alike. In Frankfurt the Central Bank conformed perfectly with Hayek’s prewar prescriptions. What was originally the least prominent strand in the weave of European integration had become the dominant pattern. Federalism stymied, inter-governmentalism corroded, what had emerged was neither the rudiments of a European democracy controlled by its citizens, nor the formation of a European directory guided by its powers, but a vast zone of increasingly unbound market exchange, much closer to a European ‘catallaxy’ as Hayek had conceived it.
  • Perry Anderson, "Depicting Europe", London Review of Books (20 September 2007)

• [Estonian Prime Minister] Mart Laar came to my office the other day to recount his country's remarkable transformation. He described a nation of people wh are harder-working, more virtuous — yes, more virtuous, because the market punishes immorality — and more hopeful about the future than they've ever been in their history. I asked Mr. Laar where his government got the idea for these reforms. Do you know what he replied? He said, "We read Milton Friedman and F. A. Hayek".
  • Dick Armey, in his address at the dedication of the Hayek Auditorium", Cato Institution, Washington, D.C., (9 May 1995)

• Yes. I read that paper carefully a few years ago and think it is incoherent because he stresses the idea people can only know their local thing. He doesn’t ever answer why the system’s price conveys the correct global information. In the Walras/Pareto story you do wind up with the correct information—subject to the appropriate assumptions—but Hayek doesn’t like that story. There are cases in game theory where local connections can actually cause a faster diffusion of ideas, and a faster convergence to Nash equilibrium than reactions to the population as a whole, but that’s not in Hayek.
  • Kenneth Arrow, August 10, 2003, in interview published in David Colander, Richard P. F. Holt, J. Barkley Rosser Jr. (ed.), The Changing Face of Economics: Conversations with Cutting Edge Economists (2004); about the question "Do you think Hayek was too optimistic about the price system as a conveyer of information?"

• People sometimes say that they don’t know what they think until they’ve said it, you know. But mind you, even as a graduate student, I’ve never thought that utility theory implies consciousness. Of course you discover things and learn about your own preferences. This is a point that I haven’t explored and that I probably should study more. It seems especially important from the point of view of innovation. By the way, what has always bothered me about Hayek is that all this local knowledge has to be transmitted before the process of social interaction can generate any new knowledge, but he doesn’t show us how that is going to happen.
  • Kenneth Arrow, in Karen Ilse Horn (ed.) Roads to Wisdom, Conversations With Ten Nobel Laureates in Economics (2009)

• Right after we published our first findings, we started getting letters from all over the country saying, "You know, all you guys have done is rediscover Austrian economics" … I admit I wasn't familiar with Hayek and von Mises as the time. But now that I've read them, I can see that this is essentially true.
  • W. Brian Arthur, quoted in "Complex Questions" in Reason magazine (January 1996), and in Hayek's Challenge : An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek (2005) by Bruce Caldwell

• As the title of his 1941 book indicates, the theory of capital lay at the heart of his theory of the cycle. The reason is that he attributes the cycle not to changes in aggregate demand, or even to changes in the quantity of capital, but to changes in the structure of production and hence the structure of the capital stock. In this, his theory was highly unusual: one of the reasons for his failure to engage more effectively with Keynes was the latter’s inability to see how the theory of capital could be of any importance for the cycle. Because the theory of capital is so central, and because it is so complex, it needs to be explained carefully. After that, the rest of his theory falls into place comparatively easily.
  • Roger E. Backhouse, "Hayek on money and the business cycle", in Edward Feser(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• F. A. Hayek, probably the most prominent advocate of capitalism in the present period would not quite agree with Smith's notions of what is natural, but his defense of capitalism is indirect by reference to its linkage with liberty, and he explicitly rejected the idea that a legitimating concept of justice is relevant to the operations of a market system.
  • Peter Berger, The Capitalist Revolution : Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality and Liberty (1988), p. 205

• It may not be amiss to seen in my calculations of comparative productivity [between entrepreneurial economics and communist economies] verification of a prescient forecast [made by Hayek in 1935 in his essay "The Present State of the Debate".].
  • Abram Bergson, "Communist Economic Efficiency Revisited", AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 82, No. 2, (May 1992), p. 30

• There were many Hayeks: Hayek, the political scientist; Hayek, the economist; Hayek, the philosopher of social science; Hayek, the psychologist. Even in these different roles, he played many parts.
  • Mark Blaug, "Hayek revisited", Critical Review 7.1 (1993)

• Why did his interest in the concept of spontaneous order and the history of the doctrine of unintended social consequences undergo very little development after the 1960s? All of his political writings are in fact amazingly repetitious, exploring a small number of big themes which, however, are not further refined or extended in new contexts. As organizing concepts, they held, I am convinced, enormous potentialities but nevertheless Hayek himself failed to realize them.
  • Mark Blaug, "Hayek revisited", Critical Review 7.1 (1993)

• Hayek’s research programme is grounded in the teaching of Adam Smith and Carl Menger, who sought to understand social order not as the result of conscious design, but as the unintended consequences of individual human action. In addition to the emphasis on spontaneous order, Hayek learned from Menger that individual human action is guided by the subjective valuations of individuals, and that the relevant valuation that individuals make is on the marginal unit of the good or service that is the object of deliberation. Throughout Hayek’s career the puzzle of how a social system can transform the individual subjective perceptions of some into useful information for others so they may co-ordinate their actions to produce an overall social order which yields benefits far greater than any individual in the system intended was at the centre of his research efforts.
  • Peter Boettke, "Hayek and Market Socialism: Science, Ideology and Public Policy", Economic Affairs (2005)

• Hayek’s reasons for holding that planning cannot work are not limited to the problem that the information required for the task of coordinating the plans of a multitude of individuals is too vast to organize effectively. The knowledge utilized within the market by entrepreneurs does not exist outside that local context and thus cannot even be organized in principle. It is not that planners would face a complex computational task; it is that they face an impossible task, because the knowledge required is not accessible to them no matter what technological developments may come along to ease the computational burden.
  • Peter J. Boettke, "Hayek and market socialism", in Edward Feser(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• I did not call him "Fritz." To me he remained always "Professor Hayek," despite his own graciousness in treating me as a peer. I shall not attempt to evaluate Professor Hayek's monumental contribution to our understanding of the events of this turbulent century, to the influence of his ideas on these events themselves or even to the development of economic theory in a strictly scientific sense.
  • James M. Buchanan, "I did not call him “Fritz”: Personal recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek." Constitutional Political Economy 3.2 (1992): 129-135

• In some of their implicit modeling of political behavior aimed at furthering special group or class interests, the Marxists seemed to be closet associates of public choice, even as they rejected methodological individualism. But how was the basic Marxist critique of politics, as observed, to be transformed into the idealized politics of the benevolent and omniscient superstate? This question was simply left glaringly unanswered. And the debates of the 1930s were considered by confused economists of the time to have been won by the socialists rather than by their opponents, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Both sides, to an extent, neglected the relevance of incentives in motivating human action, including political action.
  • James M. Buchanan, "Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program", Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University (2003)

• I did fully learn from Hayek the distinction between what I later called moral community and moral order and moral anarchy – this is about the sense that our genetic predisposition is all for the insider tribe.
  • James M. Buchanan, in Karen Ilsen Horn (ed.) Roads to Wisdom, Conversations With Ten Nobel Laureates in Economics (2009)

• An essential difference between Hayek and Friedman here was that Hayek was in many ways a dark thinker. If you read Hayek in the 1930s and 1940s, the thinks the world is coming apart. Certainly Hayek's response to the Great Depression was not one that imbued with a great deal of optimism. He thought that to a certain extent you just have to wait things out; if you try to intervene to solve the problem you'll only exacerbate it. Whereas Friedman was this tremendous optimist. Friedman was always emphasizing--he said that what Hayek and Robbins got wrong when they were responding to the Great Depression was precisely that: that they said you shouldn't do anything. He thought that part of what he was doing in monetary theory was to try to come up with a way to say that there was a solution, something that could be done that would prevent this kind of problem. A kind of counternarrative to Keynes. And he always emphasized--instead of dwelling on the catastrophic situation that the world was in, he always emphasized the ways in which those catastrophes could be solved by the market. And so when you reach this moment of deep pessimism that I think a lot of people associated with organizations like the Tea Party felt, Hayek in many ways feels more consonant with that set of views.
  • Angus Burgin, "Burgin on Hayek, Friedman, and the Great Persuasion" (March 18, 2013)

• Hayek was no opponent of theory; indeed, he frequently defended it from its historicist detractors. But he also understood the limitations of theory.
  • Bruce Caldwell, "Hayek and Socialism", Journal of Economic Literature (December 1997)

• I grant that there is one big defect in the neoclassical approach to imperfect knowledge. But it is a defect that Austrians almost never mention! The problem: Do the probabilities that people assign fit the facts? At least as researchers, most economists assume that beliefs about the world are on average correct. But empirically, this is often not so. Flying is much safer statistically than driving, but many people refuse to accept the fact. A large field known as behavioral economics documents such biases. Or to take more policy-relevant beliefs: Basic economics shows us the benefits of free trade, but few non-economists recognize them. I have a series of papers on systematically biased beliefs about economics that explores this topic.
  Now what is Prof. Boettke going to tell you? I suspect that he is going to say that merely focusing on people’s erroneous beliefs “makes me an Austrian." I call this the “Hayek said the sky is blue" tactic. If you say the sky is blue, that makes you an Austrian because Hayek defended the sky-is-blue thesis back in the 30s. Hayek talked a bit about mistaken beliefs; therefore anyone who ventures within a thousand intellectual miles of this topic is a “Hayekian.”
  This is ridiculous. By this standard not only does Hayek get credit for ideas that he did not anticipate; he gets credit for ideas that preceded his birth! Hayek made some contributions here - though frankly he was very repetitious. But he did little to advance modern rational expectations theorizing, and even less to anticipate its empirical weaknesses.
  Would I have done any better? Probably not, but if I hadn’t done a lot more I wouldn’t want my posthumous admirers showering me with undeserved credit. (Well, maybe I would, but I wouldn’t deserve it).
  • Bryan Caplan, "Why I Am Not An Austrian Economist ... And Why You Shouldn’t Be Either"

• I've long since lost all patience with Hayek. His original, true ideas could have been five good blog posts, his errors and bizarre obsessions are numerous, and his writing style insults every person who ever tried to write a decent sentence.
  • Bryan Caplan, "Two Takes on Hayek's Flabbiness"

• In fact, a large part of what we think of as economic activity is designed to accomplish what high transaction costs would otherwise prevent or to reduce transaction costs so that individuals can negotiate freely and we can take advantage of that diffused knowledge of which Friedrich Hayek has told us.
  • Ronald Coase, Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture, "The Institutional Structure of Production", in Essays on Economics and Economists (1994), p. 9

• I will be discussing what happened in economics in England, but these were times when, to a very considerable extent, this was what happened in economics. The first episode I will discuss is local, but the economists involved were among the best in the world. In February 1931, Friedrich Hayek gave a series of public lectures entitled 'Prices and Production' at the London School of Economics … They were undoubtably the most successful set of public lectures given at LSE during my time there, even surpassing the brilliant lectures Jacob Viner gave on international trade theory. The audience, notwithstanding the difficulties of understanding Hayek, was enthralled. What was said seemed to us of great importance and made us see things of which we had previously been unaware. After hearing these lectures, we knew why there was a depression. Most students of economics at LSE and many members of the staff became Hayekians or, at any rate, incorporated elements of Hayek's approach in their own thinking. With the arrogance of youth, I myself expounded the Hayekian analysis to the faculty and students at Columbia University in the fall of 1931.
  • Ronald Coase, "How Should Economists Choose?"in Essays on Economics and Economists (1994), p. 19

• For all his brilliance, Hayek didn’t — at the critical time — have a good enough understanding of the dangers of deflation. He didn’t fully realize the extent of sticky wages and prices and, more deeply, he didn’t see that ongoing deflation would render the “calculation problem” of a market economy more difficult. Hayek stressed that a market calculates value in a way that a central planner cannot — but lying behind this ability to calculate is some basic macroeconomic stability. At the key moments, Hayek did not offer the proper recipe for that stability.
  • Tyler Cowen, "The Eternal Struggle", National Review (2011)

• The basic problem is that there are three Hayeks:

  the--absolutely brilliant--price-system-as-information-aggregator Hayek.
  the--absolutely bonkers--business-cycle "liquidationist" Hayek.
  the--absolutely wrong--social-democracy-is-evil Hayek.

  The first was a genius. The second was a moron--his could never make his arguments cohere either conceptually or empirically, but he kept doubling down on them and wound up in infinite reputational bankruptcy. The third was wrong--I would say blinded ex ante by ideology, others would say proved wrong ex post by events.

  The problem is that the modern-day Hayekians are by-and-large uninterested in the good Hayek (1), and interested only in the bad Hayeks (2) and (3)...

  • J. Bradford DeLong, "Daniel Davies Watches the Hayekian Yahoos Attack the Late Tony Judt" (May 16, 2012)

• Hayek says that the problem with classical liberalism was that it was not pure enough. The government needed to restrict itself to establishing the rule of law and to using antitrust to break up monopolies. It was the overreach of the government beyond those limits, via central banking and social democracy, that caused all the trouble. A democratic government needs to limit itself to rule of law and antitrust–and perhaps soup kitchens and shelters. And what if democracy turns out not to produce a government that limits itself to those activities? Then, Hayek says, so much the worse for democracy. A Pinochet is then called for to, in a Lykourgan moment, minimalize the state. After social democracy has been leveled and the rubble cleared away, then–perhaps–a limited range of issues can be discussed and debated by a–limited–restored democracy, with some kind of group of right-wing army officers descended from latifundistas Council of Guardians in the background to ensure that property remains sacred and protected, and the government small enough to fit in a bathtub. […] Hayek was formed in Austria. From his perspective the property and enterprise respecting Imperial Habsburg government of Franz Josef eager to make no waves, to hold what it has, and to keep the lid off the pressure cooker appears not unattractive. This is especially so when you contrasted would be really existing authoritarian alternatives: anti-Semitic populist demagogue mayors of Vienna; nationalist Serbian or Croatian politicians interested in maintaining popular legitimacy by waging class war or ethnic war; separatists who seek independence and then one man, one vote, one time. An “authoritarian” after the manner of Franz Josef looks quite attractive in this context–and if you convince yourself but they are as dedicated to small government neoliberalism as you are, and that the Lykourgan moment of the form will be followed by soft rule and popular assent, so much the better. And if the popular assent is not forthcoming? Then Hayek can blame the socialists, and say it is their fault for not understanding how good a deal they are offered.
  • J. Bradford DeLong, Making Sense of Friedrich A. von Hayek: Focus/The Honest Broker for the Week of August 9, 2014

• Hayek and Marx are similar in their research programs concerning the dynamics of capitalism, its cycles, and the way in which money is vital to capitalism. They both worked a long time to master the problem, but failed to arrive at a neat solution. Hence they both abandoned the program and went on to other, more urgent, concerns. But along the way, they both left a trail of great insights and unsettled debates.
  • Meghnad Desai, "Hayek and Marx", in Edward Feser(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• The human mind, Hayek says, is not just limited in its ability to synthesize a vast array of concrete facts, it is also limited in its ability to give a deductively sound ground to ethics. Here is where the tension develops, for he also wants to give a reasoned moral defense of the free market. He is an intellectual skeptic who wants to give political philosophy a secure intellectual foundation. It is thus not too surprising that what results is confused and contradictory.
  • Arthur M. Diamond, "F. A. Hayek on Constructivism and Ethics". The Journal of Libertarian Studies IV/4: 353-365.(Fall 1980)

• Hayek gave the best exposition ever of the unpopular ideas of economic freedom that somehow triumph anyway, alleviating far more national and global poverty than more fashionable Scandinavia-envy and grandiose plans to "make poverty history."
  • William Easterly, "Dismal Science", The Wall Street Journal (15 November 2006)

• Hayek did not talk about it at the time, but his warnings about the drift toward top-down planning were perhaps most relevant of all in the so-called Third World. It is the misfortune of the field called development economics that it was born at the moment of maximum doubt about individual liberty. As a result, economists conceived of development from the beginning—and to a frightening extent still do today—as a top-down process run by development experts operating on a blank slate.
  • William Easterly, "Hayek vs. The Development Experts" (23 October 2008)

• Nor does his book offer any real historical setting for Hayek's career. Although often naive in his political judgments, Hayek was intensely concerned with public issues throughout his life. Yet we learn virtually nothing of the development of his views on the affairs of the day. What did he make, for example, of the Dollfuss dictatorship in Austria, where his teacher Ludwig von Mises served its clerical predecessor under Monsignor Seipel, and where Hayek himself planned to return in the 1930s? Mr Ebenstein never even mentions these conservative authoritarian regimes of the period. In later years, he records Hayek's efforts to secure South Tyrol for Austria once again; his organisation of the Mont Pelerin Society, an influential post-war group of free-market intellectuals; his recommendation that West Germany, France and Britain sue for entry as states into the United States; his reception in Verwoerd's South Africa and his admiration for General Pinochet's achievements in Chile; his wish that Iran be bombed in 1979 and Argentina in 1982. Homages from Barry Goldwater, Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Yegor Gaidar roll past (the only discordant note comes from Ayn Rand, once Alan Greenspan's muse: "As an example of our most pernicious enemy, I would name Hayek. That one is real poison."; or again: "The kind who do more good to the communist cause than ours"). Yet no coherent picture of Hayek's political commitments ever emerges, still less their relation to such important works as “The Constitution of Liberty” (1960).
  • "The man who knew enough", The Economist (29 March 2001)
  • From a review of Alan O. Ebenstein's book Friedrich Hayek: A Biography (Palgrave)

• The great theme of his remarkable explorations in intellectual history is the danger of all constructivism, the belief that we can deliberately design social arrangements which will be better than those we unwittingly hit upon. Paradoxically, however, the drive of Hayek's own work is itself characteristically that of a rationalist construction. Admiring David Hume and detesting Auguste Comte, his genius was to marry the sceptical insights of the one to more than a touch of the compulsive rigour of the other.
  • "The man who knew enough", The Economist (29 March 2001)

• The investigation of this problem — How is spontaneous order possible? — is sometimes referred to as the 'Hayek programme'.
  • Jon Elster, "The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order", 1989, p. 250

• I think that permanence and stability are the cardinal virtues of the legal rules that make private innovation and public progress possible. To my mind there is no doubt that a legal regime that embraced private property and freedom of contract is the only one that in practice can offer that permanence and stability … In reaching this conclusion, I have been heavily influenced by the work of Friedrich Hayek.
  • Richard Epstein, in "Simple Rules for a Complex World" (1995).

• Though Hayek clearly allows for the possibility of a retreat from socialism, whether of the hot (command planning) or cold (welfare state) variety, and planning, Hayek’s critics, apparently taking Hayek at his word, use 'inevitability' to refer to the outcome (a totalitarian polity) that, according to Hayek, is supposedly generated by the cumulative logic inherent to interventionist policy and welfare state practices. Though taking care to note that a change in policy may occur, Hayek apparently considers the logic of intervention as primarily nudging policy in one direction, necessitating ever-further government intervention.
  • Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail, "Hayek, Samuelson, and the logic of the mixed economy?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 69 (2009)

• Hayek frequently argued that any failure to adequately mend our ways—abandon “our” supposed infatuation with “social justice” and other “high ideals”—would inexorably put us in the hands of the devil. Arguably, “we”—Obama and company clearly included—have yet to change our ways.
  • Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail, "Hayek’s New Popularity: The False Claims That He Was Right", Challenge, vol. 53, no. 5 (September/October 2010)

• Much as Hayek’s penchant for claiming that "bad" interventionist policy will ineluctably drive us along the road to serfdom—ultimately culminating in full-blown command planning and political tyranny— is clearly apparent in his 1940s writings, the very same sentiments pervade the third part of The Constitution of Liberty.
  • Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail, "Supporters Are Wrong: Hayek Did Not Favor a Welfare State", Challenge, vol. 55, no. 5, (September/October 2012)

• Hayek was never blind to the potential difficulties inherent in this political synthesis, nor dismissive of the serious criticisms of capitalist society and liberal theory presented by thinkers of the left. He explicitly disavowed the ideal of laissez faire and distanced himself from the sort of free market utopianism common among more extreme libertarians. He thought it foolish to pretend that capitalism always rewards those who work the hardest or are otherwise deserving, advocated a minimal social safety net for those incapable of supporting themselves in the market, and had no objection to government taking on tasks far beyond those defining the "minimal state" of Nozick’s libertarianism, so long as this did not result in monopoly and private firms were allowed to compete with government for provision of the services in question. Like Marx, he believed that liberal capitalist society has a tendency to produce alienation, insofar as the impersonal rules of conduct upon which it rests necessarily eschew any reference to a common social end or purpose, and thus cannot satisfy the deepest human yearnings for solidarity. Unlike Marx, he also thought we nevertheless simply have no alternative to capitalism if we want to maintain the level of individual autonomy and material prosperity that are the most prized characteristics of modernity, and that it is naive and dangerous to pretend otherwise.
  • Edward Feser, Introduction, in Edward Feser(ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• What of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and their battles against government control of the economy? Here Hayek surprises. He does not disapprove of Reagan and Thatcher, but he has no high opinion of modem politicians in general. He does, however, say that Reagan's and Thatcher's policies "are as reasonable as we can expect at this time. They are modest in their ambitions." Modesty. The capacity to understand that well-meaning politicians — and their advisers, the intellectuals — will only wreak mischief if they try to guide economic development: This antipolitical concept is at the heart of Hayek's theory of economic and social development.
  • Interview of F. A. Hayek, Forbes, May 15, 1989

• There was someone who is clearly very important who also was not a member of the scientific commission, but whose career and trajectory was ultimately very important for the definition of contemporary neo-liberalism. This is the Austrian von Hayek. He came from Austria and from neo-liberalism; he emigrated at the time of, or just before, the Anschluss. He went to England and also to the United States. He was very clearly one of the inspirations of contemporary American liberalism, or of American anarcho-capitalism if you like, and he returned to Germany in 1962 where he was appointed professor at Freiburg, thus closing the circle.
  • Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979, five (7 February 1979)

• I’ve always thought, incidentally, that many of us should welcome the fact that...a particular policy idea we hold does have this adverse effect on the opinions of other people. I think this is a very good thing, because it means that those of us who hold our views have to be better to get recognized than people who hold the other views. And in the long run, what matters is the quality of people who propose the ideas and not their number and not their position. It is because it is the quality of these ideas that matters so much that Hayek’s ideas have been so wide-spread and have had such an influence, and that you are now seeing the rise in the scientific as well as in the other parts of the world of more people of this particular kind of persuasion....
  ... I am one of those who has learned a great deal from Hayek. I hope he is as effective as I think he will be in his teaching in Germany, but I also hope that we will see him back here very often indeed.
  • Milton Friedman, impromptu remarks at the 1962 testimonial dinner, Hayek Archive Box/Folder 114 : 13, quoted in Alan Ebenstein, Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (2003), Ch. 13. The Chicago School of Economics and Milton Friedman

• Friedrich Hayek's influence has been tremendous. His work is incorporated in the body of technical economic theory; has had a major influence on economic history, political philosophy and political science; has affected students of the law, of scientific methodology, and even of psychology.
  • Milton Friedman, in his foreword to Essays on Hayek (1976) by Fritz Machlup

• Over the years, I have again and again asked fellow believers in a free society how they managed to escape the contagion of their collectivist intellectual environment. No name has been mentioned more often as the source of enlightenment and understanding than Friedrich Hayek's … I, like the others, owe him a great debt … his powerful mind … his lucid and always principled exposition have helped to broaden and deepen my understanding of the meaning and the requisites of a free society.
  • Milton Friedman, in his foreword to Essays on Hayek (1976) by Fritz Machlup

• In terms of his personal characteristics, Hayek was a very complicated personality. He was by no means a simple person. He was very outgoing in one sense but at the same time very private. He did not like criticism, but he never showed that he didn’t like criticism. His attitude under criticism, as I found, was to say: "Well, that’s a very interesting thing. At the moment, I’m busy, but I’ll write to you about it more later." And then he never would! On the other hand, he wasn’t like von Mises. He wasn’t intolerant at all. You cannot conceive of Hayek doing the kind of thing that Mises did, when, for example, he wouldn’t talk to Machlup for three years because Machlup had come out for floating exchange rates at a Mont Pelerin meeting. Hayek did not do that. That was, I believe, because of the influence of the London School on him. He was very much tempered by the London School.
  • Milton Friedman, in interview with Alan Ebenstein in 1995, published as Appendix 1, in Alan Ebenstein's Chicagonomics: The Evolution of Chicago Free Market Economics (2015)

• Let me emphasize. I am an enormous admirer of Hayek, but not for his economics. That, again, is subject to misunderstanding. It depends on what you mean by economics. I’m not talking about his understanding of economics, his application of economics to the real world, or anything like that, but his contributions to the science of economics, not to economic practice, not to anything else. I think Prices and Production was a very flawed book. I think his capital theory book is unreadable. I cannot say I’ve read it. [laughter] It’s very unreadable.
  On the other hand, The Road to Serfdom is one of the great books of our time. His writings in [political theory] are magnificent, and I have nothing but great admiration for them. I really believe that he found his right vocation—his right specialization—with The Road to Serfdom. His earlier works were intended to be part of the literature of technical economics as a science, and, indeed, it was that characteristic of them that impressed Lionel Robbins and led Lionel to bring him from Austria to London.
  I never could understand why they were so impressed [at the London School of Economics] with the lectures that ended up as Prices and Production, and I still can’t.... these very confused notions of periods of production, different orders of products, and so on.
  • Milton Friedman, in interview with Alan Ebenstein in 1995, published as Appendix 1, in Alan Ebenstein's Chicagonomics: The Evolution of Chicago Free Market Economics (2015)

• There is no figure who had more of an influence, no person had more of an influence on the intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain than Friedrich Hayek. His books were translated and published by the underground and black market editions, read widely, and undoubtedly influenced the climate of opinion that ultimately brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  • Milton Friedman, in an interview with Think Tank (May 1999)

G–L

• The [seminar in economic theory conducted by Hayek at the L.S.E. in the 1930s] was attended, it came to seem, by all of the economists of my generation — Nicky [Kaldor], Thomas Balogh, L. K. Jah, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, the list could be indefinitely extended. The urge to participate (and correct Hayek) was ruthlessly competitive.
  • John Kenneth Galbraith, in "Nicholas Kaldor Remembered", in "Nicholas Kaldor and Mainstream Economics: Confrontation or Convergence?"

• Sixty-two years ago I spent a year in what is known at Harvard as the other Cambridge. It was then in the high pulse of the Keynesian Revolution. Economic discussion was constant, intense, but London also called; once a week I came up to seminars here at the London School of Economics. A major attraction was Friedrich von Hayek, the noted conservative, author of A Road to Serfdom, his widely read analysis of the disastrous but emerging welfare state. He, however, was only slightly heard. The two hours were given over, all but exclusively, to telling him he was wrong. I found myself in support of this correction; it was education by the rebuke of error. (I trust that will not be the tendency on this pleasant and, for me, nostalgic occasion.) Over the years I’ve often presented myself to ardent conservatives as a student of von Hayek; it has added in an agreeable way to their normal confusion.
  • John Kenneth Galbraith, “The Unfinished Business of the Century” (1999)

• Hayek's greatest failure is his neglect of the problem of private power. All his efforts go into the denunciation of state power, but he has little to say about private coercion.
  • Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (1996)

• Hayek's attempt to delegitimize one side of the Western tradition is one of the most significant ideological closures in his work. It prevents him from seeing the close ties which exist between liberalism and socialism.
  • Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (1996)

• Hayek’s lasting achievement was to focus attention on the limited and fragmented nature of knowledge in modern societies and the need for social and economic theorists to make that the cornerstone of their thinking. Yet in some ways he remained trapped in the rationalism he was so keen to reject. If our reason is so feeble, and if knowledge is necessarily imperfect and dispersed, how do we know this to be true? To make that claim Hayek has to take up the privileged status of observer that he is so critical of in constructivist rationalism. If he were not prepared to do so he could not justify his project of social and economic theory at all. Despite his denunciation of the ills of scientism and constructivism, Hayek is closer to the rationalism he criticizes than he might like to acknowledge.
  • Andrew Gamble, "Hayek on knowledge, economics, and society", in Edward Feser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• Hayek was an acute social theorist, but also an ideologue. He developed one of the most sophisticated theories of markets in social science, but he was also a market fundamentalist with a deep-rooted distrust of all forms of state regulation and state intervention, which tended to become more pronounced as he grew older. […] The paradox of Hayek's work however is that he stopped short of advocating either the kind of anarcho capitalism sought by some libertarians, or even the strict minimal state proposed by Robert Nozick. On the contrary he thought that the state needed to retain very strong powers to police the market order and prevent powerful interest groups such as trade unions from subverting it. But he fretted constantly about how this might be achieved, and how democratic governments could be persuaded to cease interfering with markets.
  • Andrew Gamble, "Hayek & market fundamentalism" (2007)

• Hayek's theory of knowledge is his greatest achievement, and offers insights that should be utilised by both right and left, but he failed to apply them to one of the central aspects of the modern era - the way science and technology are utilised in increasingly perverse ways by a deregulated neo-liberal market economy, which if not checked will have devastating consequences for the biosphere and the survival of the human species. It is an example of how his market fundamentalism blinds him to conclusions to which his own analysis of markets should have led him. If he had followed the logic of his own argument, he might have arrived at a rather different view of the appropriate balance between the state and the market, and provided a more searching account of the nature and limits of government action, or as Keynes would have put it, between the agenda and the non-agenda of government. The resources for doing so are there within Hayek's thought, which remains a seminal contribution to modern social theory, but he chose not to develop his ideas in this direction because of his ideological commitment to market fundamentalism. That should not prevent others from doing so. It is increasingly urgent that we should.
  • Andrew Gamble, "Hayek & market fundamentalism" (2007)

• Friedrich A. von Hayek, one of the strongest, and at times one of the few, economic voices advocating the reduction of government's role in the economy, is finally finding himself in the position of a Cassandra who suddenly that discovers people are listening.
  • John M. Geddes, "New Vogue for Critic of Keynes." The New York Times (May 7, 1979)

• Hayek's work composes a system of ideas, fully as ambitious as the systems of Mill and Marx, but far less vulnerable to criticism than theirs because it is grounded on a philosophically defensible view of the scope and limits of human reason.
  • John N. Gray, Hayek on Liberty (1984), Preface, p. ix

• No-one who knows Hayek's work can doubt that his attempt to restate liberal principles in a form appropriate to the circumstances and temper of the twentieth century has yielded a body of insights wholly comparable in profundity and power with those of his forebears in the classical liberal tradition.
  • John N. Gray, Hayek on Liberty (1984), p. 1

• Conservative ideologues have used Smith's insight--that market exchange produces an order in human affairs that no one has designed--to defend their free-market policies. Chief among them was F.A. Hayek, the Nobel Prize-winning Austrian economist who became one of the gurus of the intellectual right in the '80s. Hayek argued that the market evolves as an unintended consequence of human activity, claiming that it embodies wisdom inaccessible to any single generation and insisting that it must therefore be accepted as the basis of society. In a devastating critique of Hayek's views, Rothschild dissects the multiple ambiguities of his notion of social order and shows how removed it is from anything in Smith. Hayek believed that we must submit to the unfathomable workings of the market, but this blinkered reverence for social process was unacceptable to Smith, who viewed the market as a human construction.
  • John N. Gray, "The Past Is Prologue", Los Angeles Times (May 27, 2001)

• I still see Hayek as the best critic of all forms of centralized economic planning. It is to his merit to have shown scientifically that centralized planning cannot work for an economy because complete knowledge of that economy is never available centrally. As nice as it would be to have one, there is no mastermind who knows and can control everything, and there never will be. This was Hayek's scientific argument for the superiority of the market economy. A planned economy is only a viable means where there is a clear overarching goal – during wartime. A war economy is always a planned economy. Supporters of central economic dreams should therefore hear it once and for all: centralized economic planning is not suitable during peacetime.
  • John N. Gray, in John Gray and René Scheu, "The role of the sceptic" (2013)

• He who states that markets cannot fail, that market failure is always the result of government intervention, is a dogmatist. How the hell would he know? Overall, Hayek was not a dogmatist, although in his writings there can be found traces of such a liberal utopianism. There we encounter the motto: "What is not supposed to be, must not be! And what must not be, is not!" To me, all isms are suspicious anyway. The sceptic in me asks: why should markets be more reasonable than other human institutions? And we can see it every day: markets are also imperfect, prone to error, and in need of repair, like everything else that man has created.
  • John N. Gray, in John Gray and René Scheu, "The role of the sceptic" (2013)

• Hayek watched the interwar collapse with horror, as Keynes did, and shared many of Keynes’s liberal values. What he failed to understand is that these values cannot be renewed by applying any formula or doctrine, or by trying to construct an ideal liberal regime in which freedom is insulated from the contingencies of politics.
  • John N. Gray, "The Friedrich Hayek I knew, and what he got right - and wrong" (30 July 2015); see also John Gray (philosopher)#The Friedrich Hayek I knew, and what he got right - and wrong (2015)

• Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944), also written during the war, was too pessimistic, I believe, about the capability of present-day capitalism in most Western countries to adjust to maladjustments in the structure of production without causing intolerable unemployment. Excessive pessimism also appears in Hayek’s later writings. In Full Employment at Any Price? (1975), for example, he refers to the inflationary excesses of the 1970s as “the present crisis,” I do not wish to minimize the dangers of inflation. However, the experience of the 1980s bothin the United States and Europe shows that inflation can be stopped without producing more than relatively mild recessions.
  • Gottfried Haberler, "Reflections on Hayek's Business Cycle Theory", Cato Journal, Vol.6, No.2 (Fall 1986)

• At the time of his death, F.A. Hayek (1899–1992) was unquestionably the world’s preeminent spokesman for classical liberalism and its most important thinker. He led an immensely productive life, over the course of which he made significant contributions to a variety of disciplines, among them economics, political and social theory, psychology, and the history of ideas.
  • Ronald Hamowy, "F. A. Hayek, on the Occasion of the Centenary of his Birth", in Cato Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Fall 1999)

• There were two explanations, and one is that in Hayek and Friedman you had an absolutely marvelous cast—two people, one very bouncy and saucy and cheeky and outspoken, vigorous. This is Friedman. He was always bouncing out with ideas; sometimes they were a bit farfetched. Then you had Hayek, this very correct and rather serious, portly, gracious, slow, rather ponderous-speaking, sometimes thinking what his next sentence is going to be. And they were men unruled by any ambition, not trying to create a party, to get elected, to win votes—any of that. It was an amazing success of upright men of integrity, intellectual brilliance, not flashy, but very impressive to watch them performing over a wide range of topics.
  • Ralph Harris, interview in 2000

• It was from Hayek that I began.
  • John Hicks, Money, Interest and Wages (1982), p. 28; on his "Equilibrium and the Cycle" (1933), an influential work on the topics of intertemporal equilibrium, monetary theory, and trade cycle phenomena.

• Hayek was making us think of the productive process as a process in time, inputs coming before outputs.
  • John Hicks, Classics and Moderns (1983), p. 359

• I did not begin from Keynes: I began from Pareto, and Hayek (footnote 10: There is evidence for this, in the paper 'Equilibrium and the Cycle')
  • John Hicks, Classics and Moderns (1983), p. 359

• If Hayek believes that the spending of newly-printed currency on employment and consumption will worsen our current terrible depression, then Hayek is a nut.
  • Richard Kahn's 1932 remark quoted by Paul Samuelson, "A few remembrances of Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992)" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2009)

• The book, as it stands, seems to me to be one of the most frightful muddles I have ever read, with scarcely a sound proposition in it beginning with page 45, and yet it remains a book of some interest, which is likely to leave its mark on the mind of the reader. It is an extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a remorseless logician can end up in bedlam.
  • John Maynard Keynes, Collected Works, vol. XII on Hayek's Prices and Production (1931); Hayek provided historical background up to page 45, after that came his theoretical model.

• I am in full agreement, also, with Dr. Hayek's rebuttal of John Stuart Mill's well-known dictum that "there cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money," which he expresses admirably in the following passage from his last lecture: "it means also that the task of monetary theory is a much wider one than is commonly assumed; that its task is nothing less than to cover a second time the whole field which is treated by pure theory under the assumption of barter, and to investigate what changes in the conclusions of pure theory are made necessary by the introduction of indirect exchange. The first step towards a solution of this problem is to release monetary theory from the bonds which a too narrow conception of its task has created."
  • John Maynard Keynes, "The Pure Theory of Money : A Reply to Dr. Hayek" § IV, in Economica (November 1931), p. 395

• Hayek's mature appreciation of a society built on the foundations of individual rights, the rule of law, and limited government can thus be traced directly to his own extension of the subjectivism of the Austrian tradition in economics. It must be emphasized that the economic understanding of markets which emerges from the Austrian tradition differs sharply from the understanding of markets which informs the minimal-statist position of many mainstream economists.
  • Israel Kirzner, "Friedrich A. Hayek 1899–1992", Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society (1991), 585-592

• I was 25 years old and pursuing my doctorate in economics when I was allowed to spend six months of post-graduate studies in Naples, Italy. I read the Western economic textbooks and also the more general work of people like Hayek. By the time I returned to Czechoslovakia, I had an understanding of the principles of the market. In 1968, I was glad at the political liberalism of the Dubcek Prague Spring, but was very critical of the Third Way they pursued in economics.
  • Václav Klaus, "No Third Way Out: Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia" in Reason (June 1990), p. 28

• Hayek was one of the most significant intellectuals of the twentieth century, but though he was extremely important for people in Western countries, he was not sufficiently appreciated and recognized there. I remember being in "his" Austria in November 1989, one day before the Velvet Revolution in my country, and hearing at the University of Linz that "Hayek is dead in Austria." I reacted by saying that we would bring him back to life in Prague again. I dare argue that Hayek was more important for us in the East than for people in the West. Westerners did see a real danger in Communism, but did not see that they were beginning the path down their own Hayekian "slippery road." They often considered his views overplayed and exaggerated. For us, Hayek was our guru, our teacher, our lighthouse, our compass in the depressing era of Communism. It was easier for Hayek to capture our hearts...
  Two decades after Hayek´s death history is on the move again. State interventionism is back and growing, the Reagan-Thatcher era long forgotten, as is the Communist era. State paternalism, regulation and control, social and environmental blocking of the functioning of markets, constructivism and dirigism are here again and, especially in Europe, are stronger than ever. We must get back to Hayek’s teachings. We must once again take his books into our hands and try to spread his thoughts all over the world, because now they are as relevant as in the past.
  • Václav Klaus, Foreword to The Essential Hayek (2014) by Donald J. Boudreaux

• Hayek’s quarrels with Aristotle are of the same character as his conversations with Sir Karl Popper and Milton Friedman: the welcome criticism of peers, those who can recognise the same premisses needed to define a given problem, however they may come to differ over their conclusions. Only now do we begin to realise that something valuable may have been driven from the world when the continuity and tradition of Western civilisation was shattered in the same blows that destroyed unwanted empires. Now in Eastern Europe there is nostalgic talk of the good old days under the Hapsburg empire.
  The evolution of knowledge is inseparable from the evolution of language, and something invaluable is lost when 'sound bytes' replace the human voice, heard in face-to-face discussion of mutual concerns. Inflection counts for much, and what is not said can only be recognised when allusion and irony are possible. So Vienna waltzes.
  • Stephen Kresge, "Introduction" in F. A. Hayek, The Trend of Economic Thinking (1991)

• The most intelligent defender of capitalism today … who has as fine and as powerful a mind as is to be found anywhere.
  • Irving Kristol, in "When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness" — Some Reflections on Capitalism and "The Free Society" in The Public Interest (1970), and Capitalism Today (1971)

• As a result of the efforts of Hayek, Friedman, and the many others who share their general outlook, the idea of a centrally planned and centrally administered economy, so popular in the 1930s and early 1940s, has been discredited.
  • Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism : The Autobiography of an Idea (1995), Ch. 9 : Capitalism, Socialism, and Nihilism, p. 93

• Hayek has as fine and as powerful a mind as is to be found anywhere, and [his] Constitution of Liberty is one of the most thoughtful works of the last decades.
  • Irving Kristol

• It is in good part because of Professor Hayek's work [on the topic of social engineering], and also because of his profound insights — most notably in The Constitution of Liberty — into the connection between a free market, the rule of law, and individual liberty, that you don't hear professors saying today, as they used so glibly to say, that 'we are all socialists now.
  • Irving Kristol

• But the Hayek thing is almost entirely about politics rather than economics. Without The Road To Serfdom — and the way that book was used by vested interests to oppose the welfare state — nobody would be talking about his business cycle ideas.
  • Paul Krugman, "Things That Never Happened In The History Of Macroeconomics" (December 5, 2011)

• Marxist theory and over-capitalisation theories overlap. The true heir to this theory is an arch-conservative, von Hayek, who paradoxically and honestly recognised Marx's paternity... The essential point is not to be found in von Hayek's conservative conclusions, but in his analysis of the causes of the boom and depression, which, as he himself admits, strongly resembles the Marxian one.
  • Karl Kühne, Economics and Marxism, Volume 2: The Dynamics of the Marxian System (1979), pp. 222-223

• The central dilemma of Hayek's political philosophy is, given his view of the limited role reason can play in social life, how is it possible to mount a systematic defence of liberalism without falling victim to the very kinds of rationalism he criticises? This difficulty stays unresolved in Hayek’s political thought because it is informed by two incompatible assumptions about what reason can achieve.
  • Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism (1990), p. vii

• This tension in Hayek's thought, between the rationalist advocacy of liberal reform and the anti-rationalist critique of all social reconstruction, has inclined one commentator to describe his political theory as 'Utopian non-engineering'. While the word 'Utopian' might exaggerate a little the rationalist character of his thought, this term captures well the unstable nature of the Hayekian system of ideas. For, in the end, a Humean scepticism about the powers of reason is incompatible with a Kantian insistence on the priority of rationally justifiable principles. Hayek has tried to cast himself in the image of that most improbable of creatures: the principled sceptic.
  • Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism (1990), p. 215

• Hayek’s views should be considered because, in addressing institutional questions, he has not made the mistake of confining the problems of liberalism within national boundaries.
  • Chandran Kukathas, "Hayek and liberalism", in Edward Feser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• Hayek should be taken seriously because he has correctly identified as the most serious problems confronting civilization in the twentieth century the problems of nationalism and totalitarianism. Even with the dereliction of European communism at the end of the twentieth century, the problems which remain or are reemerging in the shape of ethnic conflict, separatist national movements, and regional trading blocs stem from practices and ideas which the liberal tradition has consistently criticized: ideas hostile to individualist, universalist, and egalitarian moral principles. While thinkers like Hannah Arendt have also recognized the threat and moral danger posed by totalitarianism, it is in Hayek’s work that we have the most thorough attempt to understand the logic of its institutional alternative.
  • Chandran Kukathas, "Hayek and liberalism", in Edward Feser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• Roughly speaking, Lundberg argued that Gunnar Myrdal's work has been enormously important, and noted that there was local pressure on the Nobel Prize Committee to recognize him, but wondered how it would be received abroad if this was done. (Remember that the Prize was then rather new, and Lundberg had to be careful about its reputation.) Giersch's reply was that the quality of the work surely merited the award, but maybe the politics of it would be easier if there was a joint recipient who was neither Swedish nor shared Myrdal's views – what about Hayek? That's it – is this where Hayek's prize came from, or was he already high on the list, or what?
  • David Laidler, "The 1974 Hayek–Myrdal Nobel Prize", in Hayek: A Collaborative Biography: Part 1 Influences from Mises to Bartley edited by Robert Leeson (2013)

• Hayek is by no means as rational and irrefutable as the right would have it. Indeed, he is often eccentric. He is a romantic, a serious deficit in a social theorist. Many of his arguments rest on a reductionist idea of socialism, and his conception of the sources of law can only be called mystical. But Hayek is not merely an eccentric mystic. In Road [to Serfdom], first published in 1944, he makes a powerful and far-ranging critique of state control of economic life. At least as far as he takes the argument in this book, there isn’t much that thoughtful modern liberals or even democratic socialists who understand the power of markets would necessarily object to—although they might feel that there is more to the story than Hayek acknowledges.
  • Jesse Larner, "Who’s Afraid of Friedrich Hayek? The Obvious Truths and Mystical Fallacies of a Hero of the Right" (Winter 2008)

• Hayek doesn’t seem to grasp that human beings can exist both as individuals and as members of a society, without necessarily subordinating them to the needs of an imposed social plan (although he acknowledges that the state can legitimately serve social needs, he contradictorily views collective benefits as incompatible with individual freedom). He rejects the very concept of social justice, for much the same reasons that he rejects the arbitrary valuation of labor: in Hayek’s view there is no way to put an objective value on a grievance or to weigh it against other claims. And because he locates all responsibility and agency only at the level of the individual, he sees no way in which any claim can be generalized to society. Hayek’s political philosophy recognizes only negative rights. Positive fulfillment beyond the most basic needs is a matter of individual striving.
  • Jesse Larner, "Who’s Afraid of Friedrich Hayek? The Obvious Truths and Mystical Fallacies of a Hero of the Right" (Winter 2008)

• In the 20th century, three world wars facilitated a Communist revolution, a Fascist backlash and the subsequent collapse of both. The weakness of bureaucratic information flows (relative to market-based competitors) undermined Communist economies – a point emphasized by Frederick Hayek, the co-leader (with Murray Rothbard) of the fourth generation Austrian School of Economics. Flows of information and disinformation played pivotal roles in the First, Second and Third (that is, Cold) World Wars.
  • Robert Leeson, Introduction in Hayek: A Collaborative Biography, Part III, Fraud, Fascism and Free Market Religion (2015), edited by Robert Leeson

• Friedrich Hayek is the twentieth-century social theorist who, probably more than any other, found himself vindicated by events — if not wholly, then at least in his central contention. He is also the one who, more than any other, himself exercised a significant political influence.
  • Michael Lessnoff, in "Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Century" (1999), p. 146

• Although he is very probably unaware of this book and of my work in general, I want to express a very belated thanks to Friedrich A. Hayek. His work had much more of an influence on me than I realized during the writing of the First Edition [of The End of Liberalism] I neither began nor ended as a Hayekist but instead found myself confirming, by process of elimination and discovery, many of his fears about the modern liberal state.
  • Theodore J. Lowi, 'Preface to the Second Edition', in The End of Liberalism (1979), 2nd Edition, p. xiv,

• It is likely that many modern economists would have no difficulty accepting Hayek's statement of the problem (of macroeconomics) as roughly equivalent to their own. Whether or not this is so, I wish … to argue that it should be so, or that the most rapid progress toward a coherent and useful aggregate economic theory will result from the acceptance of the problem statement as advanced by [Hayek].
  • Robert Lucas, Jr., in "Understanding Business Cycles", in Studies in Business-Cycle Theory (1981), p. 216

M–R

• One of the most original and most important ideas advanced by Hayek is the role of the "division of knowledge" in economic society … [But if] I had to single out the area in which Hayek's contributions were the most fundamental and pathbreaking, I would cast my vote for the theory of capital. As I said before, when I reviewed Hayek's book on The Pure Theory of Capital, it is "my sincere conviction that this work contains some of the most penetrating thoughts on the subject that have ever been published." If two achievements may be named, I would add Hayek's contributions to the theory of economic planning. Most of what has been written on systems analysis, computerized data processing, simulation of market processes, and other techniques of decision-making without the aid of competitive markets, appears shallow and superficial in the light of Hayek's analysis of the 'division of knowledge', its dispersion among masses of people. Information in the minds of millions of people is not available to any central body or any group of decision-makers who have to determine prices, employment, production, and investment but do not have the signals provided by a competitive market mechanism. Most plans for economic reform in the socialist countries seem to be coming closer to the realization that increasing decentralization of decision-making is needed to solve the problems of rational economic planning.
  • Fritz Machlup, in "Hayek's Contribution to Economics", Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 76, (December 1974)

• Well I mentioned Hayek. There are two ways. One is because of my interest in political economy. The other way is that Hayek was a pioneer in the use of information in economics. One of the papers that Karl and I wrote together that I continue to like was a paper called "The Uses of Money". In that paper we tried to incorporate information and the cost of information to explain why people use money. One of Hayek's most basic ideas is that institutions are a way of reducing uncertainty. Man struggles to find institutional arrangements which on average make life a bit more predictable. Our "Uses of Money" is not so much about money as we conventionally think about it, it's about the idea of a medium of exchange, the function of an institution called the medium of exchange and how the medium of exchange as an institution resolves a part of peoples uncertainty about the future.
  • Allan Meltzer, interviewed by Bennett T. McCallum, Macroeconomic Dynamics (1997), 238-283

• All of this, of course, establishes Hayek's primacy over Hicks in the origin of the notion of intertemporal equilibrium.
  • Murry Milgate, in Capital and Employment : A Study of Keynes's Economics (1982), p. 132

• Although the democratic left is unlikely to find his views very palatable, at least one lesson can be learned by contemplating Hayek’s life. He shows us what can sometimes be achieved by sticking doggedly to your guns, ignoring intellectual fashion, and waiting until your moment comes. Hayek had only one tune to play, the virtues of the free-market economy as opposed to central planning, but he played it with panache, could improvise longer or shorter versions as the occasion demanded, and above all never gave up practicing.
  • David Miller, "F. A. Hayek: Dogmatic Skeptic", Dissent (1994)

• He relapsed into a crude identification of socialism with Soviet-style central planning, even though, in the West at any rate, there were very few actual socialists who continued to accept that equation.
  • David Miller, "F. A. Hayek: Dogmatic Skeptic", Dissent (1994)

• If the central contest of the twentieth century has pitted capitalism against socialism, then F. A. Hayek has been its central figure. He helped us to understand why capitalism won by a knockout. It was Hayek who elaborated the basic argument demonstrating that central planning was nothing else but an impoverishing fantasy.
  • Kenneth Minogue, "Giants Refreshed II: The Escape from Serfdom: Friedrich von Hayek and the Restoration of Liberty" in Times Literary Supplement (14 January 2000), p. 11

• Friedrich A. von Hayek, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science, says that on the whole he approves of the economic policy of the Reagan Administration.
  Yet, when he discusses particulars, Professor von Hayek - a conservative who is best known as an unrelenting opponent of Socialism and lesser forms of economic interventionism -sounds less than approving. He applauds the determination in Washington and London to stop inflation but laments that both Governments seek gradual progress. "You have to do it rapidly and drastically," he says.
  • "Business People; A Nobel Winner Assesses Reagan", The New York Times (December 1, 1982)

• Information costs are reduced by the existence of large numbers of buyers and sellers. Under these conditions, prices embody the same information that would require large search costs by individual buyers and sellers in the absence of an organized market. (footnote 4: The original contributions were those of Hayek (1937 and 1945)).
  • Douglass North, in "Structure and Change in Economic History" (1981), p. 36

• I was very flattered when I once got a note from Hayek saying that he would like to come and talk with me. He had read The Rise of the Western World, and he thought it was a very interesting book. He came to Seattle and spent two days with me. We had a good time and I really enjoyed him. But I wish I had known then what I have learned since, so that I could have appreciated his visit more appropriately. I had never read his stuff on cognitive science in those days. He still seems to me the greatest economist of the twentieth century, and by a long way. If you look for people who really want to try and understand the world, Hayek came closer to that ideal than anybody who has ever lived.
  • Douglass North, in Karen Ilsen Horn (ed.) Roads to Wisdom, Conversations With Ten Nobel Laureates in Economics (2009)

• Arguably the most influential economist of this century.
  • Tom Peters, as quoted in The American Scholar (1994), p. 324

• I can testify from personal experience to the immense stimulus and direction which Hayek's migration to this country [Great Britain] gave to economic research in the 1930s, not only in London and economics faculties throughout the United Kingdom, but also in the international world of scholarship.
  • Arnold Plant, in "A Tribute to Hayek — the Rational Persuader" in Economic Age (January-February 1970)

• I think that I have learned more from you than from any other living thinker, except perhaps Alfred Tarski … but not even excepting Russell.
  • Karl Popper, in a letter to Hayek (1944)

• Our intellectual productivity is declining. Still, yours is admirable. You can still lecture (I cannot)....I know that you feel that you cannot do the work you used to do, and although you have told me and others about it, you kept it hidden from your observant friends—even though you complain to them of it, and draw their attention to it....
  But apart from the field of intellectual production, you have done so much for others. There are many former students you have encouraged and helped on their way. And there are many who, like myself, have been helped by you in the most critical stages of their development.
  • Karl Popper, on Friedrich Hayek, in 1974, in Hayek Archive 2-6, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, quoted in Alan Ebenstein, Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (2003), Ch. 15. Karl Popper

• You will never know how much you have done for me. When I was in New Zealand, out of the world and buried by all my philosophical colleagues, you remembered me. It was through you that I came back into the world. It was through you (and Ernst Gombrich) that The Open Society was published, after a period (before you interfered) which led...me almost to despair. And when I came to the LSE [London School of Economics], through you, you gave me so much encouragement and help....There cannot be, ever, equality or reciprocity between you and me. I never could do anything for you, and it is extremely unlikely that I ever shall.
  • Karl Popper, in 1964, quoted in Alan Ebenstein, Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (2003), Ch. 15. Karl Popper

• I have created myself a kind of generational gulf between you and myself. Although you were only 3 years old when I was born, you became, as I now realize, a kind of father figure....[E]ven now, when I am 82, and we have been friends for so many years, you still are! And, strangely enough, you yourself...described your feelings towards me as those towards a young man who has made good.
  • Karl Popper, on Friedrich Hayek, in 1984, in Hacohen, Popper, quoted in Alan Ebenstein, Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (2003), Ch. 15. Karl Popper

• I should like to mention that I did not know Hayek’s book (The Road to Serfdom) when I wrote mine; in fact, my book was finished about six months before his. All I knew was a little pamphlet “Freedom and the Economic System,” in which he advocates “Planning for Freedom.”...The acknowledgement in my book refers to his practical help rather than to his influence; but since I wrote my book, I have read Hayek’s book (and several excellent articles), and I can only say that I have learned a very great deal from it. A few leftists here in England are in the same position ....Hayek, who I had seen only four or five times before, has been really wonderful to me in his many repeated approaches to various publishers, and I understand from the people here in the School [the London School of Economics] that he is always so. His interest in my book was mainly due to the fact that he too is hoping for a common basis of discussion for socialists and liberals.
  • Karl Popper, on Friedrich Hayek, in 1984, In Notturno, “Popper’s Critique,” quoted in Alan Ebenstein, Hayek's Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (2003), Ch. 15. Karl Popper

• Well … I've always been a voracious reader — I have read the economic views of von Mises and Hayek, and … Bastiat … I know about Cobden and Bright in England — and the elimination of the corn laws and so forth, the great burst of economy or prosperity for England that followed.
  • Ronald Reagan, in response to the question "What philosophical thinkers or writers most influenced your conduct as a leader, as a person?" when interviewed by Rowland Evan, in The Reagan Revolution (1981) by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, p. 229

• As someone who came to Fredrick von Hayek comparatively late in life, I’m still catching up with him…Indeed, many of the insights I thought I had discovered in my own readings and writings on the frontier of evolutionary biology and economics it turns out Hayek had long before me…The field of anthropology and archaeology needs Hayek quite badly.
  • Matt Ridley, The Seventh Annual Hayek Lecture (2011)

• What distinguishes the theoretical men of the right from their counterparts on the left, Anderson writes, is that their voices were “heard in the chancelleries.” Yet whose voice has been more listened to, across decades and continents, than Hayek’s? Schmitt and Strauss have attracted readers from all points of the political spectrum as writers of dazzling if disturbing genius, but the two projects with which they are most associated—European fascism and American neoconservatism—have never generated the global traction or gathering energy that neoliberalism has now sustained for more than four decades.
  It would be a mistake to draw too sharp a line between the marginal children of Nietzsche—with political man on one branch of the family tree, economic man on the other. Hayek, at times, could sound the most Schmittian notes. At the height of Augusto Pinochet’s power in Chile, Hayek told a Chilean interviewer that when any “government is in a situation of rupture, and there are no recognized rules, rules have to be created.” The sort of situation he had in mind was not anarchy or civil war but Allende-style social democracy, where the government pursues “the mirage of social justice” through administrative and increasingly discretionary means. Even in The Constitution of Liberty, an extended paean to the notion of a “spontaneous order” that slowly evolves over time, we get a brief glimpse of “the lawgiver” whose “task” it is “to create conditions in which an orderly arrangement can establish and ever renew itself.” (“Of the modern German writings” on the rule of law, Hayek also says, Schmitt’s “are still among the most learned and perceptive.”) Current events seemed to supply Hayek with an endless parade of candidates. Two years after its publication in 1960, he sent The Constitution of Liberty to Portuguese strongman António Salazar, with a cover note professing his hope that it might assist the dictator “in his endeavour to design a constitution which is proof against the abuses of democracy.” Pinochet’s Constitution of 1980 is named after the 1960 text.
  Still, it’s difficult to escape the conclusion that though Nietzschean politics may have fought the battles, Nietzschean economics won the war. Is there any better reminder of that victory than the Detlev-Rohwedder-Haus in Berlin? Built to house the Luftwaffe during World War II, it is now the headquarters of the German Ministry of Finance.
  • Corey Robin, "Nietzsche’s Marginal Children: On Friedrich Hayek", The Nation (May 7, 2013)

• Here’s where things get interesting. Though Hayek abandoned formal economics for social theory after the 1930s, his social theory remained dedicated to elaborating what he saw as the essential problem of economics: how to allocate finite resources between different purposes when society cannot agree on its basic ends. With its emphasis on the irreconcilability of our moral ends—the fact that members of a modern society do not and cannot agree on a scale of values—Hayek’s point was fundamentally political, the sort of insight that has agitated everyone from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Hayek was unique, however, in arguing that the political point was best addressed—indeed, could only be addressed—in the realm of the economic. No other discourse— not moral philosophy, political theory, psychology, or theology— understood so well that our ultimate moral values and political purposes get expressed and revealed only under conditions of radical economic constraint—when one is forced to assign a limited set of resources to ends that favor different sectors of society.
  • Corey Robin, "Economics After Neoliberalism" (March 03, 2019)

• The intrinsic links between moral and economic life, as well as the intractability of moral conflict, were the kernels of insight that animated Hayek’s most far-reaching writing against socialism. The socialist presumes an agreement on ultimate ends: the putatively shared understanding of principles such as justice or equality is supposed to make it possible for state planners to conceive of their task as technical, as the neutral application of an agreed-upon rule. But no such agreement exists, Hayek insisted, and if it is presumed to exist, nothing will reveal its nonexistence more quickly than the attempt to implement it in practice.
  • Corey Robin, "Economics After Neoliberalism" (March 03, 2019)

• I think it's a scandal that he's not one of the absolute required names on political theory reading lists for modern political thought or 20th century political thought. I know this gets into some sensitive terrain, but he absolutely should be there alongside Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Nietzsche, Arendt. And certainly should be there over Berlin, Oakeshott, Strauss, and Schmitt. Obviously, more is better, and I want students to read everything, but we have to make choices, and I'd put H. ahead of Berlin et al.
  • Corey Robin, twitter(pt.1, pt.2) (March 4, 2019)

• I very well remember Hayek's visit to Cambridge on his way to the London School. He expounded his theory and covered a black-board with his triangles. The whole argument, as we could see later, consisted in confusing the current rate of investment with the total stock of capital goods, but we could not make it out at the time.
  • Joan Robinson, Contributions to Modern Economics, Chapter 1, p. 2

• Lange argued that what economists now call neoclassical price theory showed the possibility of combining central planning and the market, and Hayek retorted that planning would subvert at its heart the mechanism that gave capitalism its vitality. Hayek’s criticisms of market socialism, and more recently those of Janos Kornai, are for the most part on the mark. But the experiences of capitalism, as well as of socialism, in the last fifty years suggest ways of reformulating the concept of market socialism in response to the Hayekian critique of its intellectual ancestor.
  • John Roemer, A Future for Socialism (1994), pp. 1-2

• While often right and enormously influential, Hayek himself agreed that some of his predictions did not become true.
  • J. Barkley Rosser, "The Road to Serfdom and the world economy: 60 years later", European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 21 (2005)

• Since Hayek was radically scornful of human reason, he could not, like John Locke or the Scholastics, elaborate a libertarian system of personal and property rights based on the insights of human reason into natural law. Nor could he, like Mises, emphasize man's rational insight into the vital importance of laissez-faire for the flourishing and even survival of the human race, or of foregoing any coercive intervention into the vast and interdependent network of the free market economy.
  Instead, Hayek had to fall back on the importance of blindly obeying whatever social rules happened to have "evolved," and his only feeble argument against intervention was that the government was even more irrational and was even more ignorant, than individuals in the market economy.
  • Murray Rothbard, "The Hayek Centenary" (1999)

• Hayek and Nozick both think that talk of distributive justice is misleading, because it suggests the presence of a distributing person or mechanism; in a developed economy there is no such thing, and in a free society, the attempt to institute such a thing would destroy all freedom. Hayek, however, supports this view with an account of the computational impossibility of deciding what to produce and dis tribute in order to achieve justice, while Nozick is more concerned to emphasize that the state has no right to seize the resources of individuals in order to distribute them according to any principle whatever.
  • Alan Ryan, Introduction in Justice (1993) edited by Alan Ryan

S–Z

• Von Hayek was wrong. In strong and vibrant democracies, a generous social-welfare state is not a road to serfdom but rather to fairness, economic equality and international competitiveness.
  • Jeffrey David Sachs, "Welfare States, Beyond Ideology", Scientific American 295, 42 (2006)

• Hayek […] seemingly would severely limit mankind’s ability to design the future through the process of working things out. But Hayek rejects neither reason nor deliberative critique nor constructivism. The exercise of reason in deliberative critique in the service of reconstruction of economy, polity, and society is not only called for but is part and parcel of the Mengerian argument. Constructivism is inherent in the body of social theory developed by Hayek. Constructivism is practiced by Hayek. It is the fundamental logic of his life’s work. In a sense, his own practice constitutes the negation of his own argument.
  • Warren J. Samuels, Erasing the Invisible Hand: Essays on an Elusive and Misused Concept in Economics (2011), Chap. 8 : The Invisible Hand and the Economic Role of Government

• The Coase-Samuelson generation were brought up witnessing the great debate between von Mises and Lerner-Lange concerning the feasibility of socialist rational pricing to produce Utopia. (That was a reprise of earlier Pareto-Barone-Wieser-Taylor debates.) Many contemporaries believed Lerner-Lange triumphed in the debate. I came to believe that Friedrich Hayek was the true victor.
  Under static conditions where all is known or knowable (to whom?), whatever optimal states laissez-faire might occasion, so could some computer solution or some algorithms of play the game of competition also achieve. But in the real world all is changing, even in the time it takes me to write this sentence. Hayek has been persuasive — not in Whig ideology or in declaring that moderate reform of laissez-faire leads inevitably down the road to totalitarian socialism but — in arguing that experience suggests that only with heavy dependence on market pricing mechanisms can there be realized quasi-efficient and quasi-progressive organization of societies involving humans as Darwinian history has equeathed them. If a reader does not find the Hayek dynamic arguments persuasive, I will not here argue the matter further.
  • Paul Samuelson, "Some uneasiness with the Coase Theorem", Japan and the World Economy 7 (1995)

• The Hayek I met on various occasions – at the LSE, at the University of Chicago, in Stockholm (1945), at Lake Constance-Lindau Nobel summer conferences – definitely bemoaned progressive income taxation, state-provided medical care and retirement pensions, fiat currencies remote from gold and subject to discretionary policy decisions by central bank and treasury agents.
  • Paul A. Samuelson, "A few remembrances of Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992)", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 69 (2009)

• Hayek fails to account either for the passion among intellectuals for equality, or for the resulting success of socialists and their egalitarian successors in driving the liberal idea from the stage of politics. This passion for equality is not a new thing, and indeed pre-dates socialism by many centuries, finding its most influential expression in the writings of Rousseau. There is no consensus as to how equality might be achieved, what it would consist in if achieved, or why it is so desirable in the first place. But no argument against the cogency or viability of the idea has the faintest chance of being listened to or discussed by those who have fallen under its spell.
  • Roger Scruton, "Hayek and conservatism", in Edward Feser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• Hayek sees that the zero-sum vision is fired by an implacable negative energy. It is not the concrete vision of some real alternative that animates the socialist critic of the capitalist order. It is hostility toward the actual, and in particular toward those who enjoy advantages within it. Hence the belief in equality remains vague and undefined, except negatively. For it is essentially a weapon against the existing order – a way of undermining its claims to legitimacy, by discovering a victim for every form of success. The striving for equality is, in other words, based in ressentiment in Nietzsche’s sense, the state of mind that Max Scheler identified as the principal motive behind the socialist orthodoxy of his day. It is one of the major problems of modern politics, which no classical liberal could possibly solve, how to govern a society in which resentment has acquired the kind of privileged social, intellectual, and political position that we witness today.
  • Roger Scruton, "Hayek and conservatism", in Edward Feser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• I am not persuaded that Hayek got the substantive connections entirely right. He was too captivated by the enabling effects of the market system on human freedoms and tended to downplay - though he never fully ignored - the lack of freedom for some that may result from a complete reliance on the market system, with its exclusions and imperfections, and the social effects of big disparities in the ownership of assets. But it would be hard to deny Hayek's immense contribution to our understanding of the importance of judging institutions by the criterion of freedom.
  • Amartya Sen, "An insight into the purpose of prosperity", Financial Times (September 20, 2004)

• Our debt to Hayek is very substantial. He helped to establish a freedom-based approach of evaluation through which economic systems can be judged (no matter what substantive judgments we arrive at). He pointed to the importance of identifying those services that the state can perform well and has a social duty to undertake. Finally, he showed why administrative psychology and propensities to corruptibility have to be considered in determining how states can, or cannot, work and how the world can, or cannot, be run.
  • Amartya Sen, "An insight into the purpose of prosperity", Financial Times (September 20, 2004)

• Hayek himself gradually identified with classical liberalism in a more specific sense. But it seems to me an open question just where his arguments should lead us. Hayek himself started with socialist concerns and sentiments. He also clearly favored extra-market welfare provision, at least within rich countries, and his Road to Serfdom allows for government to play quite a considerable role. I would have thought that his arguments point us in the direction of ideas that everyone should pay attention to, rather than just offering a positive program for one specific view of politics. At the same time we may find that the kind of structural characteristics that he discerns in our society, and the kind of freedom we need in order to learn, may make certain kinds of otherwise attractive ideals difficult to pursue. They may also, however, make it difficult for us to solve certain other kinds of problem – such as some issues concerned with the environment.
  • Jeremy Shearmur, "Hayek’s politics", in Edward Feser(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (2006)

• No one has characterized market mechanisms better than Friedrich von Hayek.
  • Herbert Simon in "The Sciences of the Artificial" (1981), p. 41

• Friedrich Hayek, who died on March 23, 1992 at age 92, was arguably the greatest social scientist of the twentieth century. By the time of his death, his fundamental way of thought had supplanted the system of John Maynard Keynes — his chief intellectual rival of the century — in the battle since the 1930s for the minds of economists and the policies of governments."
  • Julian Simon, in "Hayek's Road Comes to an End" (3 April 1992)

• [Hayek] became [in his later years] the dominant intellectual influence of the last quarter of the twentieth century.
  • Robert Skidelsky, in a review of Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty in The Times Literary Supplement (20 September 1996)

• Which of Hayek's ideas are now widely accepted? I can't think of any. … Hayek's big idea - basically, that efficient market outcomes are emergent - is absent from most econ (though supported by lab experiments).
  • Noah Smith, twitter (10 May 2016)

• Hayek, in my view, is the leading economic thinker of the 20th century.
  • Vernon L. Smith, in "Reflections on Human Action after 50 years", in Cato Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Fall 1999)

• I first had to discover certain things for myself, and essentially it was the behavior I observed in human subjects in my laboratory study of markets that motivated me eventually to study Hayek seriously. Reading with the eyes of a new mind, I was able to appreciate an enormous depth of understanding in the work of Hayek that would have escaped me if I had not had this personal experience in the laboratory.
  • Vernon L. Smith, "Hayek and experimental economics", The Review of Austrian Economics (2005)

• The source of confusion here is that there was a Good Hayek and a Bad Hayek. The Good Hayek was a serious scholar who was particularly interested in the role of knowledge in the economy (and in the rest of society). Since knowledge—about technological possibilities, about citizens’ preferences, about the interconnections of these, about still more—is inevitably and thoroughly decentralized, the centralization of decisions is bound to generate errors and then fail to correct them. The consequences for society can be calamitous, as the history of central planning confirms. That is where markets come in. All economists know that a system of competitive markets is a remarkably efficient way to aggregate all that knowledge while preserving decentralization.
  • Robert Solow, "Hayek, Friedman, and the Illusions of Conservative Economics", New Republic (6 December 2012)

• The Bad Hayek emerged when he aimed to convert a wider public. Then, as often happens, he tended to overreach, and to suggest more than he had legitimately argued. The Road to Serfdom was a popular success but was not a good book. Leaving aside the irrelevant extremes, or even including them, it would be perverse to read the history, as of 1944 or as of now, as suggesting that the standard regulatory interventions in the economy have any inherent tendency to snowball into “serfdom.” The correlations often run the other way. Sixty-five years later, Hayek’s implicit prediction is a failure, rather like Marx’s forecast of the coming “immiserization of the working class.”
  • Robert Solow, "Hayek, Friedman, and the Illusions of Conservative Economics", New Republic (6 December 2012)

• Mrs. Hayek, I want you each day in the future to address your husband and inquire what his progress has been in what I consider to be one of the most interesting and intriguing fields, the evolution of the work of scholars.
  • George Stigler, at a going-away party in Hayek’s honor at the University of Chicago in 1962, Hayek Archive 116.10., Hoover Institution, Stanford University

• What's the single most important thing to learn from an economics course today? What I tried to leave my students with is the view that the invisible hand is more powerful than the [un]hidden hand. Things will happen in well-organized efforts without direction, controls, plans. That's the consensus among economists. That's the Hayek legacy.
  • Lawrence Summers, as quoted in "The Commanding Heights : The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that Is Remaking the Modern World" (1998) by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, p. 150

• Popper's falsification is intimately connected to the notion of an open society. ...one in which no permanent truth is held to exist; this would allow counter-ideas to emerge. Karl Popper shared ideas with his friend, the low-key economist von Hayek, who endorsed capitalism as a state in which prices can disseminate information that bureaucratic socialism would choke.
  • Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets (2001) Seven: The Problem of Induction | Sir Karl's Promoting Agent | Open Society

• During the following decade [of the 1950s] modern economic history took a dramatic swing away from the liberal-left consensus established by the Hammonds, Tawney and the Webbs. The seminal text for this change of direction was the 1954 collection of essays compiled by F. A. Hayek, "Capitalism and the Historians".
  • Miles Taylor, "The Beginnings of Modern British Social History?" in History Workshop Journal, Vol. 43, (Spring 1997), p. 163

• Even by the standards of his day Friedrich Hayek’s thought was wide-ranging and covered fields as diverse as economics, psychology, jurisprudence and social and political theory. Yet, despite this heterogeneity, underlying his intellectual contribution is a unifying philosophical approach centred upon a conception of mind and of the nature of reason. It is to this foundational aspect of Heyek’s thought, then, that attention must be paid if one is to understand his wider contributions. Regrettably, in an introductory text, there is only so much in-depth critical appraisal that one can undertake. For this reason, and by setting out his views on a variety of topics and appraising them where possible, the main purpose of this book will be to familiarise the reader with the principal themes of Hayek’s thought and to ascertain the extent to which his contributions may be considered to form a coherent system.
  • A. J. Tebble, F. A. Hayek (2010), Ch. 1 : Introduction

• Our inspiration was less Rab Butler's Industrial Charter than books like Colm Brogan's anti-socialist satire, Our New Masters … and Hayek's powerful Road to Serfdom, dedicated to 'the socialists of all parties'. Such books not only provided crisp, clear analytical arguments against socialism, demonstrating how its economic theories were connected to the then depressing shortages of our daily lives; but by their wonderful mockery of socialist follies, they also gave us the feeling that the other side simply could not win in the end. That is a vital feeling in politics; it eradicates past defeats and builds future victories. It left a permanent mark on my own political character, making me a long-term optimist for free enterprise and liberty.
  • Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (1993), p. 12

• Adam Smith, the greatest exponent of free enterprise economics till Hayek and Friedman.
  • Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (1993), p. 618

• For Dicey, writing in 1885, and for me reading him some seventy years later, the rule of law still had a very English, or at least Anglo-Saxon, feel to it. It was later, through Hayek's masterpieces "The Constitution of Liberty" and "Law, Legislation and Liberty" that I really came to think this principle as having wider application.
  • Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (1995), p. 84

• All the general propositions favouring freedom I had … imbibed at my father's knee or acquired by candle-end reading of Burke and Hayek .."
  • Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (1995), p. 604

• Hayek's analysis of the perils of the planned society and the command economy is, indeed, unrivalled. He shows how attempts to defy markets are doomed to be self-defeating. He warns us that beneath the seductive slogans and the simplistic targets of the utopians who promise heaven on earth there frequently lurks the reality of a totalitarian hell. He reminds us that we must value the habits, rules and institutions of liberty for their own sake if we are to enjoy for long the benefits that freedom brings. And all these messages are as relevant to our own age as when he first spoke to the West about that Road to Serfdom.
  Perhaps more so. This is because Hayek is still the preeminent modern philosopher of ordered liberty — something that in every continent is today under threat from dark forces of anarchy, hatred, revolution, fanaticism and violence. Against such ideologues, he encourages us to have faith in the peaceful, subtle processes by which people co-operate in fulfilling their requirements under a rule of law; to rely on an extended, spontaneous order; in short, to promote the system generally known as capitalism.
  Hayek is, therefore, the prophet not of doom and disaster, but of peace and plenty. His is a voice of wisdom for our time, and for all time. We should listen to him.
  • Margaret Thatcher, Signed Speech on Hayek, 2003

• The key importance of the amount of information available and the frequent lack of relevant information have been dealt with only in the last decades. L. von Mises and F. A. von Hayek can rightly be regarded as pioneers in this connection.
  • Jan Tinbergen, in 1979, as quoted in Recollections of Eminent Economists (1988) by J. A. Kregel, Vol. 1, p. 90

• It does tend to make Hayek a much more systematic thinker in this area than he was. I am not saying that Hayek thought of himself as a good economist but only a moderately good political scientist or philosopher, but that is the fact. […] To repeat what I said above, Hayek was only a moderately good political scientist or philosopher. (I should say that Hayek's view of my work was much the same: He thought I was a good economist but didn't like my political science.)
  • Gordon Tullock, review of Hayek's Social and Political Thought By Roland Kley, American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1996)

• The most interesting among the courageous dissenters of the 1980s were the classical liberals, disciples of F. A. Hayek, from whom they had learned about the crucial importance of economic freedom and about the often-ignored conceptual difference between liberalism and democracy.
  • Andrzy Walicki, "Liberalism in Poland" in Critical Review (Winter 1988), p. 9

• Everyone in Boston of a certain age knows the story of Rosie Ruiz, the marathoner who crossed the Boston finish line in 1980 at 2:31.56, flabby thighs and all, having barely broken a sweat. Despite mounting skepticism, she basked in the glory of having run the third-fastest female marathon in history – for a few days, that is, until a couple of students remembered seeing her jump out of the crowd half a mile from the finish.
  Something of the sort has been going on recently with the shade of Friedrich von Hayek. The Austrian economist, who died in 1992 just short of what would have been his ninety-third birthday, never made false claims for himself – far from it: he knew all too well the loneliness of the long distance runner. And scrupulous work as editor by the late W.W. Bartley, interpreter Bruce Caldwell, and biographer Alan Ebenstein, have made it possible to see the man clear.
  But the claims conservatives are making about the role he played as an economist are beginning to smack of Ruizismus. That is, they have jumped a caricature out of the bushes late in the day and claim that their guy ran a great race.
  • David Warsh, "Ruizismus among the Austrians" (4 December 2011)

• Nearly two decades ago, during dinner with the late Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek, I asked him if he had the power to write one law that would get government out of our lives, what would that law be? Hayek replied he'd write a law that read: Whatever Congress does for one American it must do for all Americans. He elaborated: If Congress makes payments to one American for not raising pigs, every American not raising pigs should also receive payments. Obviously, were there to be such a law, there would be reduced capacity for privilege-granting by Congress and less influence-peddling.
  • Walter E. Williams in The Columbia Daily Tribune (19 January 2006)

• Coming back to the question in the heading: how should Hayek be seen, after all, as an intellectual hero or an ideologue? In my (European) view, the answer would be: Under the historical condition which Hayek developed his liberal social philosophy, his courageous opposition to a fashionable, pro-socialist Zeitgeist made him an outstanding intellectual. However, as I tried to point out, he misunderstood or did not wish to understand the role of income redistribution in a free society. Instead, his continued crusading against allegedly atavistic ideals of material equality puts income redistribution at par with socialist irrationalism. This one-sided interpretation paved the way for his arguments to be over-simplified for political partisanship in the United States. Hayek’s new adherents fail to account for his intellectual stature and make him appear post mortem like an ideologue.
  • Ulrich Witt, "Friedrich Hayek: Libertarian Hero or Ideologue?" (November 15, 2015)

See also

• Milton Friedman
• Hans-Hermann Hoppe
• Curtis Yarvin

External links

• Brief biography at the Ludwig von Mises Institute
• Hayek's influence on Friesian philosophy
• Official 1974 Nobel Prize page
• Brief biography in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics at the Library of Economics and Liberty
  • "F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism" by John N. Gray, at the Library of Economics and Liberty]
• "The Road from Serfdom", interview (May 1977) by Thomas W. Hazlett in Reason (1992)
• "Objections to These Unions : What Friedrich Hayek can teach us about gay marriage" by Jonathan Rauch in Reason magazine (June 2004)
• Information and Economics: A critique of Hayek essay included in the book Towards a New Socialism (PDF document)
• Directory of links on Hayek at the Open Directory Project
• Hayek Links The most extensive list of links on Hayek
• Mises.org The Road to Serfdom in cartoons as illustrated by Look Magazine
• The Road to Serfdom in Five Minutes (QuickTime movie)

PDF documents:

• Reader's Digest version of The Road to Serfdom
• The economics of information, market socialism and Hayek's legacy
• Hayek and Socialism
• The Market Dynamics of Speculation: Hayekian Market Signals and the Rise of the Culture Industries