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Latest comment: 1 year ago1 comment1 person in discussion
This page contains the following quote attributed to Hitler:
"Since the civil war, in which the southern states were conquered, against all historical logic and sound sense, the American people have been in a condition of political and popular decay... The beginnings of a great new social order based on the principle of slavery and inequality were destroyed by that war, and with them also the embryo of a future truly great America that would not have been ruled by a corrupt caste of tradesmen, but by a real Herren-class that would have swept away all the falsities of liberty and equality."
There is no source for this quote within the article, and it is paired next to what I believe to be an image of an Arkansas Confederate battle-flag called Hardee's Moon. While I will admit some ignorance on my part regarding this flag, I do not understand why it is paired with a quote by Hitler, which is not sourced. Harry Sibelius (talk) 05:21, 21 January 2023 (UTC)Reply
Latest comment: 1 year ago1 comment1 person in discussion
Why is the first quote on this page one taken from Kevin McCarthy, the current US Republican house minority leader? It is right above "contemporaries." Why is he placed at the head of the article, before contemporaries and historians? Harry Sibelius (talk) 05:25, 21 January 2023 (UTC)Reply
Latest comment: 5 months ago1 comment1 person in discussion
For an entire century after 1815, by contrast, there was a remarkable absence of lengthy coalition wars. A strategic equilibrium existed, supported by all of the leading Powers in the Concert of Europe, so that no single nation was either able or willing to make a bid for dominance. The prime concerns of government in these post-1815 decades were with domestic instability and (in the case of Russia and the United States) with further expansion across their continental landmasses. This relatively stable international scene allowed the British Empire to rise to its zenith as a global power, in naval and colonial and commercial terms, and also interacted favorably with its virtual monopoly of steam-drivenindustrial production. By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, industrialization was spreading to certain other regions, and was beginning to tilt the international power balances away from the older leading nations and toward those countries with both the resources and organization to exploit the newer means of production and technology. Already, the few major conflicts of this era—the Crimean War to some degree but more especially the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War—were bringing defeat upon those societies which failed to modernize their military systems, and which lacked the broad-based industrial infrastructure to support the vast armies and much more expensive and complicated weaponry now transforming the nature of war.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1989)
We feel a particular horror at civil wars both because they rip apart the bonds that hold societies together and because they are so often marked by unrestrained violence towards the other side. The American Civil War probably had more casualties than all other American wars combined. Some 3 million men fought out of a total population of 30 million and at least 600,000 died and another 500,000 were injured. (The equivalent number of dead today with a much larger American population would be closer to 5 million.) Civilians, perhaps 150,000, died too, as a result of direct violence or starvation and disease. If anything civil wars have been increasing since 1945 as wars between states become rarer. Greece, Nigeria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Congo, Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia: the list is long and touches much of the world. Establishing the numbers of deaths in such conflicts is difficult if not impossible, partly because often there are no good records. And which deaths are the result of war? Do we count only the combatants or those who support them? Also the deaths as a result of starvation or disease as a result of war? So estimates run from 25 million dead in civil wars since 1945 to far lower but still horrifying figures, and we need also to take account of the millions of refugees fleeing the violence.
At the time of the Civil War, general regulations specified that the surgeon would ascertain whether a draftee's "limbs are well formed and sufficiently muscular ... his chest is ample and well formed, in due proportion to his height and with power of full expansion ... whether the abdomen is well formed and not too protuberant ..." (Baxter, 1875). Height and chest circumference measurements were to be considered, but only as part of the screening physician's subjective "estimate of the man's physical capacity." These regulations were influenced by standards imposed by European armies, such as the British and French, which involved minimum heights and chest circumferences. However, in those countries, the standards were administered by the recruiting officer in advance of any medical screening. Weight was less consistently assessed during the Civil War but if used, it was by a screening physician to evaluate for underweight, not overweight (Ordronaux, 1863). Nevertheless, conscripts with notable obesity, such as one 51-inch man weighing 313 pounds, were exempted (Baxter, 1875). Colonel Jedidiah Baxter (1875) summarized the rationale for physical standards of his time: Weight is not a regulated quality in any code of laws governing the enlistment of recruits. The circumference of chest thought to be indispensable as an accompaniment to certain degrees of stature, is carefully laid down in the English regulations, but weight is not even mentioned. It is presumed that the matter is left to the discretion of the examining surgeon, with whom the decision as to the other qualities named might, it is thought, be also left with advantage. A due proportion in the weight is quite as essential in the soldier as a well-formed chest, and is of greater importance than lofty stature. In former times, when it was necessary to make use of a ramrod in loading a musket, men of a certain height were absolutely necessary for the service; but in these days of breech-loading arms, a man from 5 feet to 5 feet 4 inches in stature, and well proportioned in build and weight is, ceteris paribus, as serviceable a soldier as can be desired. Thus, it was a physician's subjective assessment of a recruit's suitability to the demands of military service that determined Civil War selections, and this evaluation emphasized adequate weight, height, and chest size. The first U.S. Army table of weight-for-height was published later, in 1887 (Reed and Love, 1932).
[T]he minimum height for U.S. soldiers was 66 inches early in the nineteenth century and has progressively lowered, with the least stringent requirements (no minimum height standard during part of the Civil War) coinciding with national emergencies when new recruits were in greater demand.
Beginning with the Union capture of the Confederate capital of Richmond, in April 1865, and with the way that black Union troops freed a bevy of slaves in a Richmond jail, I emphasize the truly “revolutionary” meaning of the Civil War—reinforced by the fact that the Union confiscated without compensation a hitherto legally accepted form of property that was worth an estimated $3.5 billion in 1860 dollars (about $68.4 billion in 2003 dollars). (Most of the other emancipations of slaves in the Western Hemisphere provided slaveholders with some compensation, often in the form of unpaid labor from the “free-born” children of slaves who were required to work until age eighteen or a good bit older, or a period of unpaid apprenticeship for former slaves; even Haiti had to pay France a staggering sum of “compensation” in order to gain diplomatic recognition and the right to trade.) I then move on to the way this revolutionary meaning of the Civil War was repressed and transformed from the 1880s to the late 1950s (before I turn to the story of President Lincoln and slave emancipation). I believe that most readers will more deeply appreciate the issue of fugitive slave “contrabands,” the centrality of the slaveholding border states, and the fortuitous series of events that led to the Battle of Antietam and to Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, if they first know how racism and the goal of national reconciliation later led to a romanticized view of the antebellum South and an interpretation of the Civil War as a great militarySuper Bowl contest between Blue and Gray heroes. As my colleague David Blight has compellingly shown in his prizewinning book Race and Reunion, this was a “memory” in which race and slavery were never mentioned. Fortunately, this tradition of denial never wiped out an “emancipationist” tradition, kept alive by such black writers as W.E.B. Du Bois, which helped inspire the civil rights movement in the 1960s and which transformed at least our academic understanding of the rise and fall of racial slavery. This book, I hope, will join the small shelf of works that have begun to convey our academic understandings to a wider public.
David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the Americas (2006)
Another political pressure mounting on Lincoln was the growing demand by free African Americans to participate in the war. Many northern African Americans saw the war not only as a means of striking down the institution of slavery but as an opportunity to press their demands for full citizenship in a reunited nation. Even in the slavery-free North, African American rights were neither consistent nor secure. Suffrage was restricted to a few New England states, African Americans could not testify in court against a white defendant, and economic rights were not ensured. The justification for such restrictions in the North was that these rights were reserved for citizens of the United States, which free African Americans, not to mention slaves, were not. The conflict with the South, therefore, became a venue where African Americans, by demonstrating their loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for the benefit of the federal government, could improve their social status or even gain citizenship. Many African American leaders believed blacks should deny their services to the government until offered the reward of citizenship. Frederick Douglass told a Boston crowd, "Nothing short of open recognition of the Negro's manhood, his rights as such to have a country equally with others, would induce me to join the army in any capacity. Many other African Americans, however, eagerly volunteered their services to the federal government after the assault on Fort Sumter.
Steven J. Ramold, Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy (2002), p. 34-35
After the war began, hundreds of African Americans joined loosely organized military formations and presented themselves to the federal government for war service. Lincoln would have none of it. The official policy of the federal government remained, as Secretary Cameron write a group of African Americans volunteering for military service, one of rejecting African American volunteers: "This Department has no intention at present to call into the service of the Government any colored soldiers." Arming African Americans would destroy the president's claim of a war to preserve the Union, drive the border states into the Confederacy, and legitimize Southern propaganda depicting Lincoln as a tool of the radical abolitionists.
Steven J. Ramold, Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy (2002), p. 35
By early 1862, the Lincoln administration's determination to prevent African American enlistment was seriously eroding. The policy would soon be reversed, permitting full African American participation in the army and navy by the end of the year. As battle after battle occurred during the course of the year, the early expectation of a short war soon disappeared. With this discovery came the realization in the North that more manpower than originally estimated would be needed to win the war, manpower that African Americans, earlier rejected, were still willing to contribute. The securing of the border states also freed Lincoln's hands to create policy regarding African Americans. Union military victories in Tennessee and the upper Mississippi Valley and the suppression of pro-Confederate activities in Maryland firmly established the border states in the Union camp, reducing the need to placate local racist sentiment.
Steven J. Ramold, Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy (2002), p. 36